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Gautama's *Nyaya-sutra*
&
Vatsyayana's *Bhasya*
along with a free and abridged translation of the Elucidation by
Mahamahopadhyaya Phanibhusana Tarkavagisa

[PART IV : FOURTH ADHYAYA FIRST AHNIKA]

MRINALKANTI GANGOPADHYAYA

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[PART IV : FOURTH ADHYĀYA, FIRST ĀHNIKA]

MRINALKANTI GANGOPADHYAYA

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CONTENTS

I. *General examination of activity and evil* 5

1. Why activity and evil are not critically examined 6
2. Meaning of the word *pravṛtti* 6

II. *Threefoldness of evil* 7

1. Three categories of evil enumerated and described 7
2. Objection against considering attachment etc. as different and answer 8
3. Ground for considering ignorance as the most sinful one 9
4. Objection against considering ignorance as a form of evil and answer 10

III. *Critical examinatian of rebirth* 11

1. Proof for the existence of rebirth 11
2. Refutation of the view of Vaināśika Buddhists, *uccheda-vāda* and *hetu-vāda* 12
3. How manifested objects are produced 12
4. Meaning of the term *vyakta* 13
5. Objection against the view that manifested objects are produced from manifested objects and answer 13

IV. *Examination of the view that non-existence is the material cause* 15

1. Śaṃkarācārya's refutation of the above view 15
2. Gautama's refutation of the same 16
3. Opponent's position further explained and refuted 17
4. Vācaspati's arguments against the opponent 20

V. *Refutation of the view that God alone is the cause* 21

1. Position of the opponent explained 21
2. Gautama's refutation 22
3. Remarks of later commentators on Gautama's implication 23,24,25
4. Vātsyāyana's comments on the nature of God 25

VI. *Examination of the view that objects are accidental* 27

1. Opponent's view—effects have no efficient cause—discussed 27
2. Refutation of the opponent by others and Gautama's objection to it 28
3. Refutation of the opponent by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara 29
4. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's comments on the nature of *ākasmikatva-vāda*, *yadṛcchā-vāda* and *svabhāva-vāda* 30
5. Udayana's refutation of *svabhāva-vāda* 30

VII. Refutation of the view that all objects are non-eternal 32

1. Position of the opponent explained 32
2. Refutation of the opponent 32
3. Further objection and answer 33
4. Agreement of the views of Gautama and Kaṇāda 35
5. Eternality of *ākāśa* 35

VIII. Refutation of the view that all objects are eternal 37

1. Position of the opponent explained 37
2. Refutation of the opponent 38
3. Further objection and answer 38
4. Vātsyāyana's own answers 40
5. Refutation of the view that *dharma*-s only change, and not the *dharmin* 41
6. The Yoga view of three *pariṇāma*-s 42

IX. Refutation of the view that no object is a single entity 44

1. Position of the opponent explained 44
2. Refutation of the opponent 44
3. Vātsyāyana's objection to the Buddhist view 46

X. Refutation of the view that all objects are non-existent 47

1. Position of the opponent described 47
2. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's objection to Vācaspati's comments on the position of the opponent 47
3. Arguments of the opponents 48
4. Vātsyāyana's own answer to the opponent 49
5. Gautama's answer 50
6. First interpretation of Gautama's answer 50
7. Second interpretation 51
8. Third interpretation 51
9. Vātsyāyana's own answer to the opponent 51
10. Further objection and answer 52
11. Uddyotakara's objection against the opponent 54

XI. Refutation of saṃkhyaikānta-vāda-s 55

1. Vātsyāyana's description of the *saṃkhyaikānta-vāda*-s 55
2. Refutation of the above 55
3. Further objection and answer 56
4. Reason for discussing the *saṃkhyaikānta-vāda*-s 57

XII. Critical examination of result 58

1. Doubt regarding result explained 58
2. Whether the result of Vedic rites can be produced in a later period 58
3. The meaning of the term *phala* and critical examination of *phala* justified 61

4. Ground for admitting the pre-existence of an effect 61
5. Nyāya view of the prior non-existence of an effect 62
6. Arguments for and the refutation of the Sāṃkhya theory of *sat-kārya-vāda* 63
7. Objection to the view that results of Vedic rites are produced later and answer 67

XIII. Critical examination of suffering 70

1. Ground for characterising body etc. as suffering 70
2. Different kinds of pain 71
3. Whether Gautama denies the reality of pleasure 71

XIV. Critical examination of liberation 75

1. Three objections against the possibility of liberation 75
2. Answer to the first objection explained 76
3. Vedic verses and passages referring to liberation 81
4. Further arguments against the first objection 83
5. Validity of Itihāsa, Purāṇa and Dharmaśāstra 85
6. Answer to the second objection 86
7. Answer to the third objection 86
8. How the stream of afflictions can be absolutely destroyed : the views of others and Gautama 88, 91
9. Proofs for the reality of *apavarga* 93
10. Nature of the absence of suffering representing *apavarga* 93
11. Whether Gautama admits sensation of pleasure in liberation 94

NYĀYADARŚANA

ADHYĀYA IV

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Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya

N. iv. 1

CHAPTER IV

The fourth chapter of the *Nyāya-sūtra* is divided into two *āhnika*-s. The contents of the first *āhnika*, consisting of fourteen sections and sixty-seven *sūtra*-s, are :

Sūtra-s 1-2 : on a general examination of activity and evil
3-9 : on the threefoldness of evil
10-13 : on the critical examination of rebirth
14-18 : on the view that non-existence is the material cause
19-21 : on the refutation of the view that God alone is the cause
22-24 : on the view that the objects are accidental
25-28 : on the refutation of the view that all objects are non-eternal
29-33 : on the refutation of the view that all objects are eternal
34-36 : on the refutation of the view that no object is a single entity
37-40 : on the refutation of the view that all objects are non-existent
41-43 : on the refutation of the view that there is only a specific number of objects (in the world)
44-53 : on the critical examination of result (*phala*)
54-57 : on the critical examination of suffering
58-67 : on the critical examination of liberation

The contents of the second *āhnika*, consisting of six sections and fifty-one *sūtra*-s, are :

Sūtra-s 1-3 : on the production of right knowledge
4-17 : on (the reality of) 'part' (*avayava*) and 'whole' (*avayavin*)
18-25 : on (the reality of) a partless entity (i.e. atom)
26-37 : on the refutation of the doctrine of the denial of external objects
38-49 : on (the means for) the enhancement of right knowledge
50-51 : on (the means for) guarding right knowledge

Adhyāya IV *Āhnika I*

I. On a General Examination of Activity and Evil

Bhāṣya

After [the critical examination of] the mind, activity (*pravṛtti*) is to be examined critically. But, then, all that has been already said under the critical examination of 'what is the substratum of *dharma* and *adharma*' [i.e. the self], and also of the body (*śarīra*), comprises nothing but the critical examination of *pravṛtti*. Implying this, Gautama says—

Sūtra 1

Pravṛtti is as has been already discussed. //iv.1.1//

Bhāṣya

[*Pravṛtti* is] also critically examined in the same way [i.e. by what has already been said under the critical examination of the self and the body].

Let, then, there be the critical examination of evil (*doṣa*) which comes after *pravṛtti* [in the list of *prameya*-s]. To this, Gautama says—

Sūtra 2

Similar is the case with evils. //iv.1.2//

Bhāṣya

[The evils too] are critically examined in the same way [as *pravṛtti*].

The following and the like have been asserted in respect of the evils. [The evils] are the qualities of the self, for they share a common substratum with knowledge (*buddhi*). They are the causes leading to worldly existence, for they are the causes of *pravṛtti* and have the capability of leading to rebirth. They appear in a stream without any beginning, for the state of worldly existence [of the living beings] also is without any beginning. False knowledge is removed by right knowledge and when false knowledge is removed, there is a complete annihilation of the stream of attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa.*) Ultimately, then, there is liberation. This is why the evils are said to be 'characterised by origin and destruction' (*prādurbhāva-tirodhāna-dharmaka*).

Elucidation

In the first *adhyāya*, Gautama has enumerated twelve *prameya*-s. Of these, the first six *prameya*-s have been critically examined in the third *adhyāya* according to their order in the list of enumeration. After the critical examination of the mind or the sixth *prameya*, Gautama is now expected to examine critically *pravṛtti*, or the seventh *prameya*. But there is, in fact, no such examination of *pravṛtti*. Why? As Vātsyāyana explains, Gautama's answer to the above is that the critical examination of *pravṛtti* is already well done by the critical examination of the self and the body. In the third *adhyāya*, Gautama has elaborately discussed topics like the eternality of the self, how the human body is produced by *dharma* and *adharma* resulting from good or bad actions. The nature of *pravṛtti* is clearly revealed by all these discussions and hence, no further critical examination of *pravṛtti* is necessary.

It is to be noted that, according to Gautama, the word *pravṛtti* means (i) actions through speech, mind and body [cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.17] and also (ii) the good or bad results—viz. *dharma* and *adharma*—produced by the said actions [cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.2.]. Uddyotakara thus speaks of two kinds of *pravṛtti*: one 'of the nature of cause' (*kāraṇarūpā*), e.g. the actions which are the causes of *dharma* and *adharma* and the other 'of the nature of effect' (*karyarūpā*), e.g. *dharma* and *adharma* which are the effects of actions through speech, mind and body.

Guatama leaves out the critical examination of evils also, because the evils are defined as the causes of *pravṛtti* [cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.17] and hence, the critical examination of evils is covered by the critical examination of *pravṛtti* itself.

Viśvanātha, however, reads the present two *sūtra*-s as comprising a single sentence and explains Gautama's point as follows: the nature of *pravṛtti*, just like that of evils, is well-defined and hence, there being no doubt concerning their nature, they cannot be critically examined.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON A GENERAL EXAMINATION OF ACTIVITY AND EVIL

(*pravṛtti-doṣa-sāmānya-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

II. On the Threefoldness of Evil

Bhāṣya

It has been said (in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.18) that "evils are of the nature of the causes of activity". There are, however, others of the same nature—viz. self-conceit (*māna*), envy (*īrṣyā*), malice (*asūyā*), doubtfulness (*vicikitsā*), selfishness (*matsara*) and the like. Why is it that they are not mentioned ? To this, Gautama says—

Sūtra 3

> They [i.e. evils] are of three categories [only], because attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and ignorance (*moha*) are mutually different. //iv.1.3//

Bhāṣya

The said evils have [i.e. can be grouped under] three classes, i.e. three categories. The category of attachment includes sexual desire (*kāma*), selfishness (*matsara*), longing for acqiuring others' property (*spṛhā*), craving for the enjoyment of pleasures (*tṛṣṇā*) and greed (*lobha*). The category of aversion includes anger (*krodha*), envy (*īrṣyā*), malic (*asūyā*), longing for causing injury (*droha*) and intolerance (*amarṣa*). The category of ignorance includes illusory cognition (*mithyā-jñāna*), doubtfulness (*vicikitsā*), self-conceit (*māna*) and negligence of duty (*pramāda*). Thus, there being three distinct categories of evil [in which self-conceit etc. are included], the other ones are not mentioned.

[Objection] But, then, the threefoldness of [evils] becomes unjustified, because the essential characteristic of the three is the same. [Answer] No, it is not unjustified, because there is mutual difference in attachment, aversion and ignorance. Thus, attachment is of the nature of 'undue adherence' (*āsakti*), aversion is of the nature of 'absence of tolerance' (*amarṣa*) and ignorance is of the nature of false knowledge.

These [three classes of evil] are internally perceived by all the living beings. Thus, when attachment is produced, a living being cognises it in the form 'the quality of attachment exists in my self'. He also determines the absence of attachment in the [same] form : the quality of attachment does not exist in my self. Similar is the case with the other two [viz. aversion and ignorance].

[Evils like] self-conceit, envy, malice and others are not mentioned, because they come under anyone of the three categories.

Sūtra 4

[Objection] No [i. e. attachment, aversion and ignorance are not different], because they all have a single annihilator (*pratyanīka*). //iv.1.4//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Attachment, aversion and ignorance are not different entities. Why ? Because they have a single annihilator. The annihilator of all the three classes of evils is one and the same, namely, 'right knowledge' (*tattvajñāna*) which is [variously known as] 'correct understanding' (*samyaṅmati*), 'noble wisdom' (*āryaprajñā*) and 'true awareness' (*sambodha*).

Sūtra 5

[Answer] [The ground given by the opponent for the identity of attachment, aversion and ignorance] is not a valid ground, because of irregularity. //iv.1.5//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The black colour etc. of earth have a single annihilator, because [they are all destroyed by] a single conjuction with fire. [The new colour etc. of earth] produced by conjunction with fire also have a single cause [for their production].

Elucidation

A single conjunction with fire can destroy the different colours and tastes inhering in earth and produce new ones in place of the previous ones. Yet the colours and the tastes are never supposed to be identical. It is, therefore, illogical to argue that attachment, aversion and ignorance are not different from one another either because they are destroyed by the same cause, viz. right knowledge, or because they are produced by the same cause, viz. false knowledge.

Bhāṣya

Thus, there being 'mutual difference' (*arthāntara-bhāva*) [in attachment, aversion and ignorance]—

Sūtra 6

> Ignorance is the most sinful [i. e. fatal] of the three [evils], because the other two evils [viz. attachment and aversion] are not produced in one who is not under ignorance. //iv. 1.6//

Bhāṣya

Ignorance is sinful or [rather] more sinful. [The word *pāpīyān*, an adjective in the comparative degree] has been used [in the *sūtra*] considering [the evils as groups of] two [viz. (i) attachment and ignorance ; (ii) aversion and ignorance].

Why [is ignorance considered to be the most sinful one] ? Because the other two are not produced in one who is not under ignorance. Attachment and aversion are not produced in respect of one who is not under ignorance ; but they are produced, according to the respective deliberation (*saṃkalpa*), only in relation to one who is under ignorance. The deliberations which make one attracted to objects [of pleasure] are the causes of attachment and those which make one repulsive to objects [producing pain] are the causes of aversion. None of the two forms of deliberation is anything different from ignorance, for they [i. e. the deliberations] are of the nature of false knowledge. This is why attachment and aversion [are said to] spring from ignorance.

When ignorance is removed by right knowledge, attachment and aversion also cease to come into being and thus, the fact of their having a single annihilator is justified. Considering all these, it has already been explained [in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.2] that liberation is attained through right knowledge, when each previous one in the series of 'suffering, birth, activity, evil and false knowledge' is removed as a consquence of the removal of the one immediately following it.

But if [ignorance is admitted to be the cause of attachment and aversion] it would follow—

Sūtra 7

> [Objection] That [ignorance is something] other than evil, because of its 'cause-effect relation' (*nimitta-naimittika-bhāva*) [with evils like attachment and aversion]. //iv. 1.7//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] [It is observed that] the cause (*nimitta*) is something different from [the effect] and also, that the effect (*naimittika*) is something different from [the cause]. Therefore, ignorance is something other than evil, because it is the cause of evils [like attachment and aversion].

Sūtra 8

> [Answer] No [i.e. ignorance cannot be said to be something other than evil], because ignorance is covered by the definition of evil. //iv. 1.8//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Ignorance is included in the category of evil in accordance with the general definition of evil, namely, 'evils are of the nature of the causes of activity'.

Sūtra 9

> [Answer continued] Besides, the refutation [given by the opponent in *sūtra* 7 above] is not justified, because the cause-effect relation can subsist in objects of the same kind. //iv. 1.9//

Bhāṣya

[Answer continued] Various forms of substances and qualities are observed to be due to cause-effect relation among substances or qualities of the same kind.

Elucidation

The same object cannot be both a cause and an effect. Still, of the many objects of a similar kind, one may be the cause or the effect of another. Thus, a substance or a quality may produce another substance or another quality of the same kind. Similarly, ignorance, in spite of being an evil itself, can be the cause of other evils.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE THREEFOLDNESS OF EVIL

(*doṣa-trairāśya-prakaraṇa*)

III. On the Critical Examination of Rebirth

Bhāṣya

After evil, rebirth is to be critically examined.

[Objection] Rebirth is not logically possible, because the self is eternal. [It is never observed that] something which is eternal comes into being or dies. Thus, the self being eternal, birth and death cannot be justified [in relation to it]. And rebirth is nothing but these two taken together.

[In answer to the above], Gautama reiterates [in the following *sūtra*] the conclusion already proved [under *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1.18ff]—

Sūtra 10

Rebirth is actually established because of the eternality of the self. //iv. 1.10//

Bhāṣya

The eternal self departs (*praiti*), i.e. leaves behind its previous body [and it is in this sense that the self] dies. After such a death, i.e. after leaving behind the previous body, the self comes into being or becomes born [in the sense that it] takes up a different body. Both these [special forms of death and birth in the case of the self] have already been explained under the *sūtra* : 'rebirth is being born again' [*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.19]. Thus, rebirth [for the self] means taking up a different body after the previous one has been discarded. And this is possible only on the [admission that the self is] eternal. [That is, birth and death in the case of the self are to be taken in special senses, and not in the ordinary senses as the opponent wrongly thinks.]

The view of one [i.e. the Buddhist sect known as Vaināśika] who admits actual birth and death of the self (*sattva*) is vitiated by the absurdities of 'not acquiring the result of an action performed' (*kṛtahāna*) and 'acquiring the result of an action not performed' (*akṛta-abhyāgama*).

For those who subscribe to the 'doctrine that, in death, the self too perishes' (*ucchedavāda*) or to the 'doctrine that the self too is caused' (*hetuvāda*), the precepts of the sages become meaningless.

Elucidation

Refuting the view of the Vaināśika Buddhists, Vātsyāyana says that if the self is admitted to be characterised by real death and birth, there will be two absurdities : (i) *kṛtahāna*—the self that had previously performed some actions would not live upto the time of enjoying the results of those actions and thus, it would be unable to acquire the results of itș own actions, and (ii) *akṛata-abhyāgama*—the previous self which had been the actual agent of the past actions being absent at the time of enjoying the results of those actions, it would be a different self that would get related to those results and thus, the (new) self would acquire the results of actions performed by someone else.

As to the doctrines of *ucchedavāda* and *hetuvāda*, Vātsyāyana contends that, if there be no self after death, the enjoyment (*bhoga*) of the results of its own actions in the 'next world' (*paraloka*) would not be possible, and, again, if the self is assumed to be produced (newly) along with the body, the present self, being absent previously, cannot enjoy (in this birth) the results of its actions performed previously (in other births). Thus, the precepts of the sages concerning the performance or avoidance of the different rites become meaningless.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa notes that the above two docrtines are referred to in the Brahmajālasutta, *Dīghanikāya* (1.3.9-10) and *Yogadarśana*, Samādhipāda (commentary on *sūtra* 15).

Bhāṣya

But, then, how are [the body etc.] produced ? [To this, Gautama says]—

Sūtra 11

'Manifested objects' (*vyakta*) appear from manifested [elements], because it is established by perception. //iv.1.11.//

Bhāṣya

In what manner, and from what kind of cause are produced the manifested objects like the body and others ? Manifested substances like body, senses, sense-objects, materials [for the body etc.] and their substratum—the existence of which are established by *pramāṇa*—are produced from [the atoms of] earth and the like [i.e. water, fire and air] which are manifested, called by the term *bhūta*, very minute, and eternal. Manifested means 'perceptible by senses'. The causes [i.e. the atoms, though really imperceptible] are also said to be manifested because of their similarity with those [perceptible objects produced from the atoms]. What is the point of similarity? [The point of similarity is] the possession of qualities like colour etc. The body as characterised by the qualities of colour and the like is produced from the eternal [atoms of] earth and others which too are characterised by [the same] qualities of colour and the like.

[Now is explained the expression:] "because it is established by perception". It is observed that, from the elements of earth and others which are characterised by the qualities of colour and the like, is produced a substance of a similar nature [i.e. as characterised by the qualities of colour etc.]. On the basis of this [observed fact] is inferred [the existence of] the imperceptible [atoms as characterised by different qualities]. It is inferred that the imperceptible and eternal atoms of earth and others are the [ultimate] causes, for it is observed that the qualities of colour etc. are invariably persent in both the 'material cause' (*prakṛti*) as well as the 'effect shaped out of it' (*vikṛti*).

Elucidation

For the right comprehension of the nature of rebirth it is necessary to understand how and from what material cause the body is produced. Besides, from very ancient times, there have been current divergent views regarding the ultimate causes of the material objects. In the present *sūtra*, therefore, Gautama mentions his own view from which it follows that, according to him, the ultimate causes of the material world are the four kinds of atoms and not *avyakta* or *prakṛti*, as is admitted by the followers of Sāṃkhya. The present *sūtra* thus also contains an implicit reference to the atomic theory (*paramāṇu-kāraṇa-vāda* or *ārambha-vāda*). The details of the atomic theory are discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* iv.2.16ff.

Vātsyāyana points out that the term *vyakta* (manifested or perceptible) applies to the atoms or the ultimate causes of material objects only in the secondary sense of 'similar to what is manifested or perceptible' and that the point of similarity consists in the atoms' possession of the 'specific qualities' (*viśeṣaguṇa*) like colour etc. The presence of the specific qualities in the atoms is proved by the presence of the same in their effects, because the specific qualities of the effect always come from the similar specific qualities of the material cause. If, for instance, there is no colour in atoms, the dyad (*dvyaṇuka*) would be without colour and, again, the dyad being so, the triad (*trasareṇu* or *tryaṇuka*) too would be without colour; ultimately, thus, there would be no object characterised by colour.

Sūtra 12

[Objection] No [i.e. one manifested object is
not produced from another manifested object],

because one jar is not produced from another
jar. //iv.1.12//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] This also [i.e. the opposite of what Gautama has said in *sūtra* 11 above] is proved by perception. It is never observed that one manifested jar is produced from another manifested jar. [Thus, it follows] that the cause [of a manifested object] is not itself manifested, because a manifested object is not observed to be produced from another manifested object.

Sūtra 13

[Answer] The refutation [by the opponent in the
preceding *sūtra*] is not justified, because a jar
[though not produced from another jar] is
produced from a manifested [cause, viz. the
potsherd]. //iv.1.13//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] We do not say that every object is the cause of another [identical] object. [We only say that] whenever a manifested substance is produced, it is produced from a similar one [i.e. a manifested material cause]. Thus, the object from which a jar is produced is a manifested substance made of earth, known as potsherd (*kapāla*). The view of one who denies this [well-observed cause-effect relation between two manifested objects] can never be acceptable to anyone. Therefore, this [i.e. the view of Gautama] is the only right conclusion.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF REBIRTH

(*pretyabhāva-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

IV. On the view that Non-Existence is the Material Cause

Bhāṣya

After this [i.e. after the discussion of Gautama's own view], the views of 'philosophers opposing' [Gautama] (*prāvāduka*) are now shown—

Sūtra 14

> [Objection] The existent is produced from non-existence, because it does not come into being 'without destroying' (*anupamṛdya*) [the cause]. //iv.1.14//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The thesis [of the opponent] is this : the existent is produced from non-existence. Why ? Because [the existent] comes into being after destroying [the cause]. The sprout comes into being only after destroying the seed, and not without destroying it. If the destruction of the seed is not [admitted to be] the cause of the sprout, let, then, there be the production of the sprout even when the seed has not been destroyed. [That is, it follows that the material cause of the sprout is the non-existence of the seed.]

Elucidation

After stating his own view that the four kinds of atoms are the ultimate causes of the produced objects, Gautama starts the critical examination of the views of other philosophers in this regard, for one's own conclusion becomes properly established only after the rival theories are discussed and refuted.

The opponent contends that the instance of the sprout which appears only after the destruction—i.e. non-existence—of the seed leads to the inference that the material cause of all existent entities is non-existence.

According to Śaṅkara, the above view was held by the Buddhist. Refuting it (*Brahmasūtra* ii.2.26-27), he says that if non-existence 'which has no essential nature of its own' (*niḥsvabhāva*) is admitted to be the material cause of an object, there would be the absurdity of an object being produced even from an unreal entity like the horn growing on the head of a hare. Besides, if non-existence were the material cause of the existent, each existent entity would have been apprehended as 'inseparably related with non-existence' (*abhāvānvita*). The effects like the jar etc., however, are never perceived to be so.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa lastly notes that a similar view is found also in the Upaniṣads as a 'view of the opponent' or *pūrvapakṣa* (*Chāndogya* vi.2.1. and *Taittirīya*, Brahmavallī, 7.1).

Bhāṣya

To the above contention of the opponent, the answer is given [as follows]—

Sūtra 15

> [Answer] The statement [that the effect comes into being after destroying the cause] is not plausible, because of contradiction (*vyāghāta*). //iv.1.15//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The statement that [the effect] comes into being after destroying [the cause] is not justified, because of contradiction. It is not possible that what destroys would come into being after the act of destroying [takes place], for it must be present already [even before the act of destroying]. Again, [it is also not possible that] what comes into being [after the act of destroying]—i.e. what is yet to be produced and [therefore] absent [until the act of destroying takes place]—would be able to perform the act of destroying.

Elucidation

The opponent has claimed that the sprout comes out after destroying the seed. It follows, therefore, that the sprout does not exist *before* the destruction of the seed. But, then, how can the absent sprout be a cause for the destruction of the seed ? If, again, the existence of the sprout destroying the seed is admitted even before the destruction of the seed, there is no sense in saying that the sprout comes out *after* the destruction, for it exists already. In short, the characteristics of 'being a cause for the destruction of the seed' and 'being an effect produced after the destruction of the seed' are contradictory to each other and cannot belong to the same sprout.

Sūtra 16

[Objection] No [i.e. the statement of the opponent, which is rejected by Gautama in the preceding *sūtra* is really possible], because 'terms expressing the relation between a noun and a verb' [*kārakaśabda*, e.g. terms like *kartṛ* or agent and *karman* or object] are applied to even what is destroyed (*atīta*) or 'yet to be produced' (*anāgata*). [That is, an entity in spite of being absent at that moment is often referred to as the agent or the object of a particular action.] //iv.1.16//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Terms expressing the relation between a noun and a verb are even applied to objects which are destroyed, yet to be produced and absent [at a particular time and place]. Thus, there are found many figurative (*bhākta*) uses [in respect of an object that is absent], such as : a son will be born, rejoicing at the son who will be born, selects a name for the son who will be born, a jar was produced, feels sorry for the jar which had been broken, [these are] the potsherds of a jar which had been broken, and sons who are yet to be born are causing grief to the father.

What is this figurativeness [i.e. what is the basis of the figurative use in the opponent's statement, viz. the sprout comes out after destroying the seed] ? [The basis of] the figurative use is succession (*ānantarya*). On the basis of the succession [between the production of sprout and the destruction of seed], [the statement that the sprout comes out after destroying the seed] means that the sprout appears only after the destruction of the seed. Thus, when it is said 'the future sprout destroys the seed', [the seed is said to be] the agent [of the act of destroying] only in a figurative sense.

Sūtra 17

[Answer] No [i.e. even admitting that the opponent's statement is justified in a figurative sense, it cannot be admitted that the existent is

> produced from non-existence], because [a sprout] is never produced from [a seed which is] destroyed. //iv.1.17//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] A sprout is never produced from a seed which is destroyed and as such, [it cannot be admitted that] the existent is produced from non-existence.

Elucidation

As Phaṇibhūṣaṇa explains, Gautama's implication here is as follows. The opponent's claim that his statement is justified in a figurative sense may be accepted. Still, neither the destroyed seed nor the destruction of the seed can be accepted to be the material cause of the sprout, for an object which is destroyed, being absent at the moment the effect is produced, cannot be the cause of any object. Nor can it be argued that non-existence in the form of the destruction of the seed is the material cause of the sprout, for the said non-existence—if it be something unreal (*avastu*) —cannot be the material cause of anything that is real (*vastu*). It is an absurd position that the root-cause of the world is something unreal or non-existent, while the world or the effect is something real or existent, for the material cause and the effect are generally of an identical nature.

Secondly, if non-existence which is devoid of all qualities like colour, taste etc. is said to be the material cause, the effects too would be without any such quality.

Thirdly, there being no specific (or real) difference in the various pieces of non-existence, there follows the absurdity of the sprout of barley being produced even from non-existence in the form of the destruction of a rice-seed.

Even if non-existence in the form of the destruction of the seed be admitted to be real, it cannot be the material cause of the sprout, for an object of the nature of a substance alone can be the material cause and also because, non-existence being itself without any quality, its effects too would become so.

Sūtra 18

> [Answer continued] [The view of the opponent, however, is] not [totally] refuted, because it mentions [the correct] order [of the two phenomena, viz. the destruction of the seed and the production of the sprout]. //iv.1.18//

Bhāṣya

[Answer continued] Order (*krama*) means the invariability of [the relation] of 'priority and posteriority' (*paurvāparya*) between the destruction [of the seed] and the production [of the sprout], and this has been mentioned [by the opponent] as the ground [proving] that the existent is produced from non-existence. Such an order, however, is not denied [by Gautama] [Thus, Gautama only denies the claim that such an order proves that non-existence of the seed is the material cause of the sprout.]

A [new] substance is produced when a different 'compact shape' (*vyūha*) is formed by the component parts [of any substance] after they have disintegrated and the former compact shape [representing the old substance] has disappeared; [a new substance is not produced] simply from non-existence. Thus, the component parts of the seed lose their former compact shape when movement is produced in them by some cause and they give rise to a different [or new] compact shape, from which new compact shape, again, is produced the sprout. [This is to be admitted], for it is observed that the causes for the production of the sprout are, in fact, the component parts [of the seed] and their mutual conjunctions [forming a different compact shape]. The component parts of the seed cannot form a new compact shape so long as their previous compact shape does not disappear and thus is justified the order or the invariability of the relation of priority and posteriority between the destruction [of the seed] and the production [of the sprout]. Therefore, [it cannot be admitted that] the existent is produced from non-existence.

The [material] cause for the production of the sprout is nothing but the component parts of the seed and hence is justified the rule that [one desirous of a sprout] invariably collects a seed.

Elucidation

That the production of the sprout is invariably preceded by the destruction of the seed is not denied even by Gautama, for it is a fact established by observation. Gautama, however, contends that non-existence or the destruction of the seed is not the material cause of the sprout, which, it is observed, is constituted by the disintegrated component parts of the seed and nothing else. Thus, in the Nyāya view, non-existence or the destruction of the seed is only a 'co-operating cause' (*sahakāri-kāraṇa*) for the production of the sprout. When, for instance, a new colour is produced in a substance due to conjunction with fire, the destruction of the original colour is held to be an auxiliary cause for the production of the new colour.

Vācaspati Miśra points out that not only non-existence in the form of the destruction of the cause, but even the 'antecedent non-existence' (*prāgabhāva*) of the effect —which invariably precedes the effect—cannot be admitted as the material cause of the effect, because of the following absurdities: (i) antecedent non-existence is a beginningless (*anādi*) entity and hence, its effect too would become beginningless and (ii) the various pieces of antecedent non-existence have no real difference in themselves and hence, the effects too would not be really different from one another.

As to the scriptural sayings declaring the creation of the world out of the non-existent (*asad evedam agra āsīt*, *asataḥ saj jāyata* etc.), Vācaspati Miśra says that they represent merely an 'opponent's viewpoint' (*pūrvapakṣa*) which has, in fact, been refuted elsewhere (*sad eva saumyedam agra āsīt* etc.). Nor can it be maintained that the world is not really existent—that it appears only due to an imputation of existence to what is non-existent, just like a snake wrongly imagined in a piece of rope. An entity which has no real existence can never be an object of uncontradicted knowledge and the material world being on object of such knowledge can never be declared to be non-existent. Besides, for one who denies reality to the world as a whole, there would be no knower and consequently, no knowledge whatsoever. Thus, one would never be able to make any logical debate at all.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE VIEW THAT NON-EXISTENCE IS THE MATERIAL CAUSE

(*śūnyatā-upādāna-prakaraṇa*)

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V. On the Refutation of the view that God Alone is the Cause

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Bhāṣya

Now, others say—

Sūtra 19

> [Objection] God [alone] is the cause, for an action of a person is [sometimes] observed to be without result. //iv.1.19//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] A man performing an action [for some desired end] does not necessarily attain the result of his action. From this it is inferred that the attainment of the result of an action [performed by] a person is dependent upon something other [than the action itself]. And [the being] on whom depends [the attainment of the result] is God. Therefore, God [alone] is the cause. [That is, it is to be admitted that there is an almighty supreme being or God who, according to His own will, creates or destroys the world and dispenses the results of actions to different living beings.]

Elucidation

There is divergence of opinion as to what exactly is the opponent's thesis in the present *sūtra*. The apparent meaning of the *sūtra*—viz. God is the cause (*īśvaraḥ kāraṇam*) etc.—cannot be taken to represent the opponent's thesis, because, as Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out, Gautama too admits God as the creator of the world. The opponent's thesis should therefore be understood as 'God alone is the cause—and neither the living beings nor the actions performed by them'.

According to Vācaspati Miśra, the opponent's thesis here is a different one: 'Brahman is the material cause of the world'. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa explains that Vācaspati's interpretation is based on the idea that Gautama, under the critical examination of rebirth, has already given his own conclusion regarding the material cause of the world. Next, in course of refuting the various theories of opponents in this regard, Gautama has refuted the view that non-existence is the material cause of the world. Accordingly, in the present section, he takes up for criticism another well-known doctrine that Brahman is the material cause of the world.

Vācaspati Miśra explains the opponent's argument as follows. The actions of the living beings cannot be the cause of anything by themselves, without being governed by an intelligent agent. But no ordinary person can be accepted as such an intelligent agent, because an ordinary person with his limited power and knowledge can never govern the innumerable actions of the different living beings going on from a beginningless period. Besides, it is also observed that an ordinary person often performs actions which produce no result or becomes engaged to actions even knowing them to be without result. Thus, the existence of an omniscient intelligent agent or God can be denied by no means. Why not then admit that God is also the material cause of the world ?

Later commentators, however, do not accept Vācaspati's interpretation. Viśvanātha, the author of the *Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti*, though stating the view of Vācaspati first, finally remarks that, in fact, the present section is designed to refute the view that God alone—as independent of the actions of the living beings—is the 'efficient cause' (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) of the world, and there is no ground for maintaining that Gautama here criticises the doctrine admitting God or Brahman as the material cause of the world.

Rādhāmohana Gosvāmin, the author of the *Nyāya-sūtra-vivaraṇa*, who is much later than Viśvanātha, explains the present section first in the line of interpretation suggested by Vācaspati. Finally, however, he comments that the present *sūtra* which actually represents Gautama's own standpoint and is a 'statement of the conclusion' (*siddhānta-sūtra*) is designed to provide inferential proof for the existence of God.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that references to the view that God alone—as independent of the actions of the living beings—is the cause of the world are to be found in *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (under Nakulīśa-pāśupata system), *Mahābodhijātaka* and *Buddhacarita* (ix.53).

Sūtra 20

> [Answer] No [i.e. God alone—as independent of the actions of the living beings—is not the cause of the world], because no result is produced in the absence of actions performed by the living beings. //iv.1.20//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] If the attainment of the results [of actions] were dependent upon [i.e. due to] God alone, the results would have been produced even without any effort on the part of the living beings.

Elucidation

Explaining further the implication of the *sūtra*, Uddyotakara says that, if God alone is admitted to be the cause, the living beings would experience pleasure or pain even without performing any action. Thus, there would result an absolute cessation of all activities and liberation would be an impossibility. Besides, the same God being the only cause, all entities would be of the same nature and there would be no variety in the world.

Vācaspati Miśra, who believes the present section to be a refutation of the doctrine admitting Brahman as the material cause of the world, gives only his own arguments against the said doctrine, without providing however any hint as to how the ground mentioned in the present *sūtra* can be directed against it.

Rādhāmohana Gosvāmin, though himself rejecting the interpretation of Vācaspati, suggests an explanation of the present *sūtra* from Vācaspati's viewpoint, which is as follows. The expression *puruṣa karma* in the *sūtra* signifies all the perceptible causes of an effect. Thus, the *sūtra* implies that no effect is ever produced in the absence of its perceptible causes. A jar, for instance, is never produced without such perceptible causes as the efforts of the potter, a staff, a wheel, two earthen potsherds and so on. It is, therefore, proved, from the instance of a jar which has only two earthen potsherds as the material cause, that the material causes of the various effects also are material objects, and not Brahman or God.

Sūtra 21

> [Answer continued] [The ground in the preceding *sūtra*, viz. because no result is produced in the absence of actions performed by the living beings] is not [to be taken as] a ground [establishing that *only* the action of the living beings—excluding God—is the cause of the world], because [the attainment of the results of actions by the living beings] is due to [the discretion of] God. //iv.1.21//

Bhāṣya

[Answer continued] When God looks kindly upon the action of a person —i.e. when God [helps] to bring about the result [of a person's action], [he attains the result of his action]. When God does not [help] to bring about [the result of a person's action], the action of a person produces no result. Thus, [the attainment of the result of a person's action] being due to [the discretion] of God, [the ground of the preceding *sūtra*, viz.] 'because no result is produced in the absence of actions performed by the living beings' is not [to be taken as] a ground [establishing that only the action of the living beings—excluding God—is the cause of the world].

Elucidation ,

In the preceding *sūtra* Gautama has contended that, in addition to God, the action of the living beings too is to be admitted as the cause of the world on the ground that no result ever comes about in the absence of the said action. An opponent may argue, on the same ground, that the actions of the living beings alone—which are the most indispensable factors—should be regarded as the cause of the world and there is no necessity of admitting God also as a cause.

Explaining Gautama's answer to the above objection, Vātsyāyana says that the causality of God cannot be denied, because the actions of the living beings and the attainment of their results are both governed by God and the success or failure of a person's actions is always dependent upon the discretion of God. Thus, according to Vātsyāyana, the word *tat* in the *sūtra* stands for God.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa notes a further implication in the present *sūtra*. An opponent may argue that the ground in the previous *sūtra*—that no result is ever produced in the absence of actions by the living beings—points to the obvious conclusion that theactions are the causes of the results. This, however, leads to the absurd position that every action of the living beings is attended with the intended result, for the presence of the cause implies the presence of the effect. Gautama avoids the absurdity by pointing out that the attainment of results is not possible without the grace of God and, therefore, an action does not produce any result when He does not look kindly upon it.

According to Viśvanātha, the word *tat* here is equivalent to the expression *puruṣa-karmābhāva* (absence of the specific *adṛṣṭa* of a person producing an intended result) in the previous *sūtra* Moreover, the expression *ahetu* is to be taken in the sense of 'what does not produce the (intended) result' (*phala-anupadhāyaka*). The implication of the present *sūtra* would, therefore, be : the actions of the living beings sometimes do not produce the intended results due to the absence of the specific *adṛṣṭa*-s which too are the causes of such results.

Viśvanātha also refers to the view of some other Naiyāyikas who explain the implication of the three *sūtra*-s of the present section in a different way. According to them, the expression *īśvaraḥ kāraṇam* (in *sūtra* 19) states Gautama's own conclusion, viz. God is to be admitted as the 'efficient cause' (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) of the world. An opponent may argue that the efficient cause of an effect is generally observed to be an ordinary person and hence, there is no necessity of admitting God. The objection is answered by the expression *puruṣakarmāphalya-darśanāt* (in the same *sūtra*). From the fact that an ordinary person is sometimes engaged to even fruitless actions, it follows that he is ignorant or has only limited knowledge. Therefore, he can never be an efficient cause in the creation of the world.

The opponent may still argue that no effect is produced in the absence of the specific *adṛṣṭa* conducive to it. Let it be admitted, therefore, that an ordinary person—through the efficiency of *adṛṣṭa*—would be the cause of the world. This objection is given by Gautama in *sūtra* 20. Next, answering the objection in *sūtra* 21, Gautama says that God is to be admitted, because the actions of the living beings as well as their *adṛṣṭa*-s are all governed by God. An ordinary person with limited knowledge and power can never govern the innumerable actions and *adṛṣṭa*-s of the different living beings in the world.

Bhāṣya

God is a distinct form of self differentiated [from the ordinary selves] by certain qualities. [God is to be admitted as of the nature of the self, because] God cannot be logically included in any class other than the class of self. [That is, God can be likened to no other *prameya* except self or *ātman*.] Thus, God is a distinct form of self differentiated [from the ordinary selves] by the absence of vice (*adharma*), false knowledge and carelessness (*pramāda*) as well as by the possession of virtue (*dharma*), [eternal] right knowledge, carefulness (*samādhi*) and accomplishments (*sampad*). The results of God's virtue and carefulness are the eight kinds of accomplishments like the 'superhuman power of becoming as minute as an atom' (*aṇiman*) etc. The virtue of God which comes about in accordance with His deliberation [and is not produced, as in the case of ordinary persons, by external actions] leads the aggregates of virtue and vice present in the various individual selves and the material elements like earth etc., [to activity for the creation of the world]. Thus, as the result of God's own action is to be taken his power of creating the world at the very moment He has the will and hence, the rule that one always attains the result of one's own action would not be inapplicable [to the case of God also].

Moreover, God is just like a trusted [friend to all the living beings]. A father [is affectionate] to his own children [without any self-interest]. Similar is the case with God who acts as [an affectionate] father to all the living beings [in the world].

God cannot be included in any class other than the class of self. No other quality except knowledge can be logically justified to be the probans for proving God's existence. And it is established by scriptural sayings that God is the perceiver (*draṣṭṛ*) [of all], the knower (*boddhṛ*) [of all] and omniscient (*sarvajñātṛ*). Who can, therefore, logically claim that God—who is inferred through the probantia proving the existence of the self, viz. knowledge and the like—is indeterminate (*nirupākhya*) and beyond the purview of perception, inference or verbal testimony ? [That is, the doctrine that God is indeterminate and devoid of all qualities cannot be accepted, because God, being of the nature of self, must possess the qualities of knowledge etc.]

If it is admitted that God engages Himself [for the creation of the world] without taking into account the attainments of the results [of the living beings'] own actions, there would follow all the charges that have already been pointed out against the view that the creation of the body is not depended upon *adṛṣṭa* [cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 2. 60ff]. [That is, the world is created by God, not in an arbitrary manner but in accordance with the *adṛṣṭa* s of the living beings produced by their actions.]

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE REFUTATION OF THE VIEW THAT GOD ALONE IS THE CAUSE

(*kevala-īśvara-kāraṇatā-nirākaraṇa-prakaraṇa*)[1]

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[1] According to Uddyotakara and others the present section is a 'section on the view that God is the material cause of the world' (*īśvara-upādānatā-prakaraṇa*).

VI. On the view that Objects are Accidental

Bhāṣya

Now, someone else says—

Sūtra 22

> [Objection] The existent entities are produced from 'no efficient cause' (*animitta*) [i.e. are produced without any efficient cause], because the sharpness of a thorn and the like are observed [to be so]. //iv.1.22//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The body etc. are produced without an efficient cause. Why? Because the sharpness of a thorn and the like are observed [to be so]. As for instance, it is observed that [the effects like] the sharpness of a thorn, the variegated colour of the minerals in the mountain and the hardness of the rock are without any efficient cause, and have only material causes. Similar is the case with the creation of the body etc.

Elucidation

According to a section of the Cārvākas, effects have only 'material causes' (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) and no 'efficient cause' (*nimitta-kāraṇa*). This, however, goes against Gautama's admission of God, inasmuch as, according to him, God is nothing but an efficient cause of the world. Accordingly, the above Cārvāka view is taken up for critical discussion in the present section.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa explains the position of the opponent as follows. The sharpness of a thorn implies nothing but a peculiar (pointed) shape resulting from a specific form of arrangement amongst the minute component parts of a thorn. That the material cause of such a peculiar shape is constituted by the minute component parts of a thorn is thus proved by perception and hence, the existence of the material cause cannot be denied. However, no efficient cause of the sharpness of a thorn—in the form of either a conscious agent or something else—is ever observed. It follows, therefore, that the sharpness of a thorn has a material cause only and no efficient cause. Similar would be the case with every other effect in the world including the human body.

Though the present section is named alike by both earlier and later commentators of the *Nyāya-sūtra* as the 'section on the accidentality of objects' (*ākasmikatva-prakaraṇa*), it is to be noted that, according to Vātsyāyana and others, the opponent's thesis here is 'effects have material causes only,but no efficient cause', while, according to Vardhamāna and others, it is 'an effect has no invariable or fixed (*niyata*) cause.'

Sūtra 23

> [Answer given by others] [It cannot be argued that an effect is produced] without an efficient cause, inasmuch as no-efficient-cause [i.e. the absence of the efficient cause itself] becomes an efficient cause. //iv.1.23//

Bhāṣya

[Answer given by others] It has been said [by the opponent in the preceding *sūtra*] that the existent entities are produced *from* 'no efficient cause'. An efficient cause, however, is only that from which an effect is produced. Thus, [the opponent cannot argue that] the production of the existent entities is without an efficient cause, for it follows [from the statement of the opponent himself] that no-efficient-cause is the efficient cause [of an effect].

Sūtra 24

> [Gautama's answer] [The answer given in the previous *sūtra*] is not a proper refutation, because there is difference between 'efficient cause' [i.e. the admission of an efficient cause] and 'no efficient cause' [i.e. the denial of an efficient cause]. //iv.1.24//

Bhāṣya

[Gautama's answer] The [admission of] an efficient cause and the denial of an efficient cause are but quite different things. A denial can never imply [the admission of] what is actually sought to be denied, just as, when the possibility of water is negated by saying that the gourd-vessel does not contain water, it [can, in no way, be construed as implying that] there is water. [Thus, the denial of an efficient cause can, in no way, be understood as implying the admission of an efficient cause.]

The doctrine under discussion [viz. effects have no efficient cause] does not differ from the doctrine—[already discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.2.60ff]—that the creation of the body etc., has no efficient cause in the form of *adṛṣṭa.* Thus, due to its [i.e. of the doctrine being discussed here] identity with [the doctrine previously discussed], the present doctrine is to be considered refuted simply by the refutation of that [previous] doctrine.

Elucidation

Though rejecting the answer given by others, Gautama does not offer any argument of his own to refute the opponent's view given in *sūtra* 22 above. Vātsyāyana, therefore, points out that the said view of the opponent is not basically different from the view—already refuted by Gautama under *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.2.60ff—that the creation of the body etc. is not dependent upon *adṛṣṭa*, and hence, Gautama does not offer any independent refutation here. The implication of Vātsyāyana's remark is as follows. In the last section of the third chapter, it has already been established by various arguments that, in the creation of the body etc., *adṛṣṭa* is necessary as an efficient cause. Again, in the previous section of the present chapter it has been shown that God, the agent governing the innumerable *adṛṣṭa*-s of the innumerable living beings, is but an efficient cause of the world. And all these adquately establish the untenability of the view that an effect has no efficient cause.

Uddyotakara gives some independent arguments to refute the opponent's view here. First, if the opponent tries to prove, with the help of an inference, that an effect has no efficient cause, he will have to admit at least (i) a person to whom the thesis is communicated (*pratipādya-puruṣa*) and (ii) a person who communicates the thesis (*pratipādaka-puruṣa*). But these two persons can be nothing other than the efficient causes of the 'act of communication' (*pratipādana-kriyā*). Thus, if the opponent really intends to express his view, he cannot totally deny an efficient cause. Secondly, what does the opponent do to express his own view ? Obviously, he utters the sentence 'the existent entities are produced without an efficient cause etc.' This shows that the opponent too believes that the words comprising the above sentence are only efficient causes in the act of expressing his view. Otherwise, why should he utter such a sentence ? Thirdly, the sharpness of a thorn cannot be a proper instance in proving that effects have no efficient cause, for it is not unanimously held by all that the sharpness of a thorn is without an efficient cause. In fact, in the case of objects like a jar or a piece of cloth, the efficient causes in the form of the potter and the weaver are proved by perception, and this only leads to the inference that the sharpness of a thorn too must have some efficient cause.

It has already been noted that, according to both earlier and later commentators of the *Nyāya-sūtra*, the present section comprises the refutation of the doctrine known as *ākasmikatva-vāda*. In this connection, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that, though not in agreement with the interpretation of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara here, *ākasmikatva-vāda* has also been interpreted as the view that effects are produced by 'mere chance' (*akasmāt*) without depending upon an invariable or fixed cause. In this interpretation, the terms *yadṛcchā* and *akasmāt* being really synonymous, *ākasmikatva-vāda* becomes identical with *yadṛcchā-vāda*, a doctrine well-known from ancient times and referred to in the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣat* (i. 2) along with other similar theories. This is quite evident from the comments of Śaṃkarācārya and Śaṃkarānanda on the above-mentioned Upaniṣat, Gautama's use of the term *yadṛcchā* in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 2. 31 and Vātsyāyana's use of the term *ākasmika* in his comments on *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.1. illustrating the utility of *tarka* (*Nyāya Philosophy*, pt. i, p. 21). Thus, in fact, it has been held by the later commentators like Vardhamāna and others that Gautama in the present section seeks to refute this form of *ākasmikatva-vāda*.

It is also to be noted that, though *yadṛcchā-vāda* and *svabhāva-vāda* represent undoubtedly two different doctrines, the advocates of *svabhāva-vāda* too refers to the same instance of the sharpness of a thorn to substantiate their view, as is evident from Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita* (ix. 52); Nemicandra's *Gommaṭsāra* (verse 883) and Dalhaṇācārya's comments on *Suśrutasaṃhitā* (śarīra-sthāna i.11). Moreover, after logically establishing the cause-effect relation—that every effect is preceded by some cause, Udayana (under *Nyāyakusumāñjali* i. 5) elaborately discusses and refutes *ākasmikatva-vāda* introducing it with the words '*akasmād eva bhavatīti cet* ?' (if it be argued that effects are produced by mere chance ?). He also takes up the criticism of *svabhāva-vāda* in the later part of his exposition. Though the commentators like Varadarāja and Vardhamāna explain that the word *akasmāt* in the above expression, being a non-derivable (*avyutpanna*) word, is synonymous with *svabhāva* and Udayana refutes therein *svabhāva-vāda* alone and not *ākasmikatva-vāda* also, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa contends that such an interpretation can hardly be accepted due to the fact that nowhere else the Svabhāvavādins are observed to set forth their view with an expression like '*akasmād bhavati*'. From Udayana's discussion, it may however be concluded that the said two doctrines have at least one point of similarity, namely, that both of them deny the necessity of an invariable or fixed cause for the production of an effect.

On the evidence of all these, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues that the present section may be understood also as a refutation of *svabhāva-vāda*, by taking *sūtra* 22 as a statement of the Svabhāvavādins.

Udayana's main argument against the above two views may briefly be noted. It is observed that every effect comes into being in relation to some particular points of time and space only, and neither always nor everywhere. Thus, those particular points of time and space are to be admitted as the invariable conditions for the appearance of that particular effect, for otherwise there would follow the absurdity of all the effects being arbitrarily produced always and everywhere. Such an admission, however, means nothing but the acceptance of some definite cause and neither *ākasmikatva-vāda* nor *svabhāva-vāda* remains logically justified.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE VIEW THAT OBJECTS ARE ACCIDENTAL

(*ākasmikatva-prakaraṇa*)

VII. On the Refutation of the view that All Objects are Non-eternal

Bhāṣya

Others, however, think that—

Sūtra 25

> [Objection] All objects are non-eternal. because they have the properties of 'being produced' (*utpatti*) and 'being destroyed' (*vināśa*). //iv.1.25//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] What exactly is meant by 'non-eternal' ? That which exists during 'some limited period' (*kadācit*) only [and not always] is non-eternal. An object having the property of being produced does not exist so long as it is not produced, and an object having the property of being destroyed does not exist after it has been destroyed. What, again, is meant by 'all objects'? [The expression 'all objects'] signifies the material objects like the body etc. as well as the non-material objects like knowledge etc. Both kinds [of objects] are ascertained as having the properties of 'being produced' and 'being destroyed'. Therefore, all objects are non-eternal.

Elucidation

If it can be established that all objects are non-eternal, the self too would be so, and if the self be non-eternal, there would be no rebirth, which, as Gautama argues (in *Nyāya-sūtra* iv.1.10), is proved on the basis of the eternality of the self. This is why Gautama takes up for refutation the view asserting the non-eternality of all objects.

Sūtra 26

> [Answer] No [i.e. it cannot be said that everything is non-eternal], because the 'non-eternality' [of all objects, advocated by the opponent] is itself eternal. //iv.1.26//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] If it is [admitted] that the 'non-eternatity' of all objects itself is eternal, it cannot be [argued] that all objects are non-eternal, because of the eternality of the said 'non-eternality' itself.

If, on the other hand, it is [admitted that the 'non-eternality' of all objects] itself is non-eternal, all objects would become eternal when that 'non-eternality' [of all objects] ceases to exist.

Elucidation

The opponent advocates the 'non-eternality' of all objects. But, what exactly is the nature of the 'non-eternality' itself? Is it eternal or non-eternal? If it be eternal, the opponent has to admit at least one eternal entity and his thesis would be contradicted. If, again, it be non-eternal, it would also be characterised by origin and destruction. It would thus remain absent before its production and after its destruction. Thus, all objects would become eternal after the destruction of that 'non-eternaltiy'.

Sūtra 27

> [Objection] The 'non-eternality' [of all objects] itself is non-eternal [and is destroyed] just like fire which, after destroying the things capable of burning, is itself destroyed. //iv.1.27//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The 'non-eternality' [of all objects] also is non-eternal. How? Just as fire, after destroying the things capable of burning, is itself destroyed, so also is the case with the 'non-eternality' of all objects which is itself destroyed after destroying all [non-eternal] objects.

Elucidation

Fire, after burning up completely what is put into it, is itself put out due to the absence of anything to hold on. Similar is the case with the 'non-eternality' of all objects. After completely destroying all the non-eternal objects, the 'non-eternality' itself ceases to exist, there being no object or substratum left in which it may be said to inhere.

From the statement of the opponent in the present *sūtra*, it follows that he admits not only the destruction of all objects, but also a further destruction of that destruction itself. Incidentally, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa here notes (before Gautama refutes the opponent in his own way) the argument of others who, denying a further destruction of destruction itself, point out that such an admission leads to the absurd possibility of the re-appearance of the object destroyed. Let us take, for instance, the case of the jar and its destruction. So long as the destruction of the jar is there, the jar cannot be present, for the 'destruction of the jar' and the 'jar' are mutually opposed. But the moment the destruction of the jar is destroyed, there being nothing to negate the presence of the jar, the jar should be present once again, just as it was before its own destruction.

The opponent may contend that the appearance or production of the jar depends upon some specific causes. The destroyed jar does not appear once again only due to the absence of the specific causes producing it, even when the destruction of the jar itself is destroyed. To this, others answer that, if further destruction of a destruction is admitted, one would have to admit an infinite number of destructions without any rest anywhere, for each destruction—being itself non-eternal—would lead, in its turn, to further and further destructions. Thus, the view of the opponent will be vitiated by the fallacy of 'infinite regress' (*anavasthā*).

Sūtra 28

> [Answer] An eternal entity cannot be denied, because [the eternality or non-eternality of an entity] is determined according as it is ascertained to be [by *pramāṇa*-s]. //iv.1.28//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] This doctrine [of the opponent] rejects [the reality of an eternal entity. But such rejection of an eternal entity is not justified. Why ? Because [the eternality or non-eternality of an entity] is determined according as it is ascertained to be. An entity which is ascertained, with the help of *pramāṇa*-s, to be characterised by the properties of being produced and being destroyed is non-eternal, while an entity which is not ascertained [to be so] is the opposite [i.e. eternal]. It is not ascertained by *pramāṇa*-s that the properties of being produced and being destroyed characterise [any of the entities like] the very minute particles of the elements (*bhūta*) [i.e. the atoms], *ākāśa*, time (*kāla*), space (*diś*), self, mind, some of their qualities, universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*). Therefore, all these are [to be admitted as] eternal.

Elucidation

In the present *sūtra*, Vātsyāyana explains and illustrates the answer of Gautama with the help of some well-known conclusions of the Vaiśeṣikas. It clearly follows therefrom that the views of Gautama and Kaṇāda, though not alike in every respect, are in full agreement with each other, so far as the basic philosophical issues are concerned. This is why the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems are commonly spoken of as the 'allied systems' (*samāna-tantra*).

In this connection, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa strongly criticises the tendency of some to disparage Gautama by maintaining that, in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, Gautama does not establish any original thesis of his own, but only reiterates and substantiates the ideas and conclusions already established by Kaṇāda. Nor is there any ground to conclude that the Nyāya school is opposed to none of the other systems. It is true that Śaṃkarācārya has sometimes quoted the views of Gautama with great reverence in the *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*. Still, there is no justification for the assumption that he does not criticise and refute the views of Gautama, for he has quoted and refuted the conclusions of Kaṇāda (which basically agree with those of Gautama).

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa further notes that undoubtedly, according to both Gautama and Kaṇāda, *ākāśa* is an eternal entity (cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.2.1 and *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* ii.1.28). The main argument of Kaṇāda for the eternality of *ākāśa* is that a substance which is non-eternal and a product must have some material cause. The material causes of the non-eternal substances like a jar or a piece of cloth are constituted by their component parts, namely, the potsherds or the threads. But there can be no material cause for *ākāśa* which, just like the atoms, is conceived to be a partless substance, for, unlike the elements of earth etc., it can be neither divided into smaller component parts nor reduced to atoms. Thus, the eternality of *ākāśa* is proved on the ground of its being a partless substance.

The followers of Sāṃkhya and Vedānta contend that the eternality of *ākāśa* is contradicted by scriptural sayings (cf. *tasmād vā etasmād ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*, *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* 2.1, etc.). Thus, in the Vedānta view, the material cause of *ākāśa*, according to the above scriptural saying, would be Brahman. There are, however, two serious considerations against the Vedānta view. First, it is an observed fact that the effect always appears as inseparably united with its material cause, e.g. an earthen object with earth. However, no effect—*ākāśa* or anything else—is ever observed to be so united with Brahman. Secondly, there is the rule that the specific qualities of the material cause produce qualities of the same kind in its effect, e.g. the white colour of a piece of cloth comes from the white colour of the threads. Accordingly, consciousness which is a specific quality of Brahman should also produce the same in *ākāśa* and the other objects of the world which are said to have Brahman as the material cause and there would be no inanimate object. Such an absurdity can be avoided only by rejecting the thesis that Brahman is a material cause. In fact, the scriptural sayings allegedly speaking of the non-eternality of *ākāśa* are to be taken in a secondary sense, and thus, there would also be no contradiction.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE REFUTATION OF THE VIEW THAT ALL OBJECTS ARE NON-ETERNAL

(*sarva-anityatva-nirākaraṇa-prakaraṇa*)

VIII. On the Refutation of the view that All Objects are Eternal

Bhāṣya

Here is another of the 'views subscribing exclusively to a single alternative' (*ekānta-vāda*) [e.g. 'objects are only non-eternal' or 'objects are only eternal' etc.]—

Sūtra 29

[Objection] All objects are eternal, because the five material elements are eternal. //iv.1.29//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] All these [i.e. the various objects like a jar, a piece of cloth etc.] are nothing but [of the nature of] material elements which, however, are eternal, because the absolute destruction of the material elements is not logically justified.

Elucidation

The present section is devoted to the refutation of the view of the eternality of all objects, which too, just like the view refuted in the previous section, goes against Gautama's conception of rebirth, for if the body etc. of the self also be eternal and not subject to origin or destruction, rebirth would be an imposibility (cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* iv.1.10). The contention of the opponent is that the various objects in the world are essentially identical with the five material elements, namely, earth, water, fire, air and *ākāśa*. These material elements—the first four in their ultimate constituents (i.e. as atoms) and the last one by itself—are all eternal. Therefore, the effects produced from them also are eternal.

Vācaspati Miśra first explains the opponent's viewpoint here in the same way as Vātsyāyana. He then introduces the conclusive *sūtra* of Gautama (i.e. *sūtra* 30 below) after establishing the Nyāya thesis that the objects like the jar etc. are not mere aggregate of atoms. Later, however, he refers to the opponent's thesis as a Sāṃkhya view. On this, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that, though from *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* (v.72) and

Sāṃkhya-kārikā (verse 10) the eternality of all objects does not appear to be a Sāṃkhya thesis, Vācaspati Miśra's remark may be somewhat justified in the sense that the effects or the twenty-three evolutes (*tattva*) like *mahat*, *ahaṃkāra* etc. exist *always* for, according to the Sāṃkhya view, the effects are present in their material cause, though in an unmanifested form, even before their production and are not absolutely destroyed.

Sūtra 30

> [Answer] No [i.e. all objects are not eternal], because the causes for the production and the destruction [of objects like the jar etc.] are actually observed. //iv.1.30//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The cause for the production [of an effect] as well as the cause for the destruction [of an effect] are actually observed. [On the admission that] all objects are eternal, there will be a contradiction with this [fact established by observation].

Sūtra 31

> [Objection] [The refutation given in the previous *sūtra*] is not a proper refutation, because [all the objects] possess the 'specific characteristic' (*lakṣaṇa*) of the [five eternal] material elements. //iv.1.31//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] An object—the causes for the production and the destruction of which, you think, are actually observed—is not perceived to be a different entity devoid of the specific characteristic of the [five eternal] material elements. Thus, [even] an object [allegedly non-eternal] is [to be considered as] essentially identical with nothing but the material elements [and hence, as eternal], inasmuch as it also contains the specific characteristic of the material elements. Therefore, the refutation [given in *sūtra* 30] is not logical.

Elucidation

The specific characteristic of the material elements—viz. the possession of a specific quality perceptible by an external sense (*vahirindriya-grāhya-viśeṣaguṇavattva*) —is present not only in the four kinds of atoms and *ākāśa*, but also in the various objects like the jar etc. In other words, the jar etc. are not really different from the four kinds of atoms and *ākāśa*, the five eternal material elements. Therefore, they also are to be viewed as eternal.

Sūtra 32

> [Answer] No [i.e. all objects are not eternal], because the production [of the jar etc.] and also, the cause for their production are actually observed. //iv.1.32//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] It is perceived that the same kind of [specific] qualities as are present in the [material] cause are produced [in the effect also] and that there is a cause [for such production of qualities]. These two [i.e. production of qualities and its cause] are not possible in respect of an eternal entity. The perception of the production [of qualities] and its cause also cannot be denied. Nor can there be any perception which is without any object. Thus, on the strength of the perception [of the production of qualities in the effect and its cause], it is inferred that [a different entity in the form of] the effect, which is endowed with the same kind of [specific] qualities as are persent in the [material] cause, has been produced. And such an effect is the object of the perception [in the form 'it is a jar', 'it is a piece of cloth, and so on]. This is how the presence of the specific characteristic [of the material elements in the effects like the jar etc.] is justified. [That is, though the effect produced is a different entity, it shares the specific characteristic of the material elements, only because the material elements are its material causes, and the specific qualities of the material cause produce the same in the effect also. Thus, there is no ground for the opponent's contention that the effects like the jar etc.—since they also contain the specific charactersitic of the material elements—are to be viewed as essentially identical with the five eternal material elements and hence, eternal.]

An effort on the part of a knower [i.e. an intelligent person] guided to action by [the assumption that] there are actual causes for the production and the destruction [of the jar etc.] is also observed. [Thus, the practical activity of an intelligent person also proves the non-eternallty of some objects.]

Moreover, the 'whole' (*avayavin*) as characterised by the said |properties, viz. origin and destruction] is well-known. [The reality of] the 'whole' as characterised by the properties of origin and destruction [and also as distinct from a mere aggregate of the parts or atoms] has already been logically established [under *Nyāya-sūtra* ii.1.33ff].

Besides, [the probantia] do not pervade sound (*śabda*), action (*karman*) and knowledge (*buddhi*) etc. [The probantia mentioned by the opponent for proving the eternality of all objects] are 'because of the eternality of the five material elements' and 'because of the possession of the specific characteristic of the material elements'. But these do not pervade the entities like sound, action, knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and internal effort [which are not material and do not have the said specific characteristic]. Therefore, these probantia are irregular [and do not prove the eternality of all objects].

[Objection] If it be argued that [the perception of the causes for production and destruction] is a false cognition, just like the false knowledge of an object in a dream ? [Answer] Similar may be the case with the perception of the material elements. [Objection explained] [It may be said] that, just as, in a dream, there is the false experience of an object [that does not actually exist there], so also is there a false cognition of the causes for production and destruction [which, all objects being eternal, do not really exist]. [Answer explained] If it be so, it is equally applicable to the perception of the material elements also. Thus, there follows the absurdity that the perception of earth etc. even is false just like the false knowledge of an object in a dream.

[Objection] If it be argued that in the absence of earth etc., all practical activities would cease ? [Answer] It is equally applicable to the other case. If there also be no [real] object underlying the preception of the causes for production and destruction [i.e. if the reality of the causes for production and destruction is not admitted], there would result the cessation of all practical activities.

In fact, the instance cited here—viz. just like the false knowledge of an object in a dream—is not a proper ground [i.e. does not prove its point], because the [five] eternal [material elements] are imperceptible and also because, [in the opponent's view], origin and destruction cannot be the object of [any right] perception.

Elucidation

After explaining Gautama's answer to the objection raised in *sūtra* 31, Vātsyāyana himself refutes some possible rejoinders from the opponent. As against the contention that the perception of the causes for the production and the destruction of an effect, being as illusory as a dream-experience, does not prove the non-eternality of objects, he finally argues that, in the opponent's view, the jar etc. too would become imperceptible, for they are claimed to be essentially identical with the five eternal material elements—viz. the four kinds of atoms and *ākāśa*—all of which are imperceptible. As a consequence, the production and the destruction of the jar etc. also would never be an object of a right cognition, which, again, indicates that they would never be an object of a false cognition either, for an object that is never rightly cognised is also never falsely cognised. Besides, according to the opponent, the production and the destruction of an object are events that are absolutely non-existent. But anything absolutely non-existent can never be the object of even a false cognition. An object falsely known in a dream is not totally unreal, for it actually exists elsewhere. Thus, the instance of dream-experience even does not substantiate the opponent's point.

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Only some particular property of the 'basic material' (*upādāna*) which is everlasting (*avasthita*) is destroyed and, again, only some particular property [of the same] is produced. 'Production' and 'destruction' [are spoken of] in relation to such [properties only and not in relation to the basic material]. The particular property which is [said to be] produced exists even before its production [as latent in the basic material]. And also, the particular property which is [said to be] destroyed, exists even after its destruction [as latent in the basic material]. Thus, all the objects are [to be viewed as] eternal. [To this, Gautama answers]—

Sūtra 33

> [Answer] No [i.e. the above view cannot be accepted], because, [in that case], the 'respective difference' (*vyavasthā*) [in certain cases] cannot be justified. //iv.1.33//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] [If the opponent's view is accepted], the respective difference [between production and destruction, as expressed by] 'this is the production [of a property]' and 'this is the destruction [of a property]' cannot be justified, because [both the properties]—the produced one and the destroyed one—are equally ever-present.

There can also be no justification for the respective difference [as expressed by] 'only this particular property is produced [and not any other]' and 'only this particular property is destroyed [and not any other]', because there is no difference [so far as] the presence of the properties is concerned. [That is, both the produced and the destroyed properties being equally ever-present none can be spoken of as 'exclusively produced' or 'exclusively destroyed'.]

Moreover, the specific difference with reference to time—namely, 'the production [of a property] or the destruction [of a property] relates to *this* particular point of time, and not to *that* particular point of time'—cannot be justified, because [a property, whether produced or destroyed,] remains always.

Also, the specific difference [between a property with production and destruction and a property without production and destruction, as expressed in the form] 'this particular property only has been produced and destroyed, and not any other' cannot be justified, because they have no difference [due to the fact that both of them remain always].

Nor can the specific difference with reference to time—such as [this property existed in] the past or [this property will exist in] the future—be justified, because existence (*sadbhāva*) is indicative of a relation with the present time only. [That is, in the opponent's view, all the properties exist always. This means that they are always related to the present time and hence, they can be spoken of as related to neither the past nor the future.]

On the other hand, if it be [admitted] that production means the appearance of what had been previously absent and that destruction means the disappearance of what had been previously present, these charges can be avoided. Therefore, the claim made by the opponent that [a property] exists even before its production and that it remains even after being destroyed is illogical.

Elucidation

From the remarks of Vātsyāyana introducing the present *sūtra*, it follows that the opponent's view refuted here by Gautama represents a thesis of the Pātañjala system (cf. *Pātañjala-darśana*, Vibhūtipāda, *sūtra* 13, commentary by Vyāsa). According to it, every *dharmin* (lit. a property-possessor ; an object having some attributes) has three forms of transformation : (i) *dharma-pariṇāma*, (ii) *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma* and (iii) *avasthā-pariṇāma*. These may be illustrated with the example of gold. When gold is reduced to the form of a ring, the ring which retains all the essential properties of gold in spite of a change of the shape represents the *dharma-pariṇāma* of gold. Again, when the goldsmith melts away the ring and reduces it to the form of a necklace, the ring—after forsaking its connection with the present time—becomes connected with the past time, and the necklace—after forsaking its connection with the future time—becomes connected with the present time, and this is an illustration of *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma.* Lastly, the changes of the existing necklace itself—in its newer and older states—provide an illustration of *avasthā-pariṇāma.*

After explaining the three forms of transformation, Vācaspati Miśra says that, in the above view, *dharma*-s are not absolutely different from the *dharmin*, they are both 'different from and identical with' (*bhinnābhinna*) the *dharmin.* As identical with the (everlasting) *dharmin, dharma*-s are everlasting and, again, as different from the *dharmin, dharma*-s are characterised by origin and destruction. Following such a line of interpretation, therefore, all objects may be viewed by the opponent as everlasting or eternal.

Vātsyāyana brings out the significance of Gautama's answer by referring to a number of wellknown cases the implication of which cannot be satisfactorily explained, if the opponent's view is accepted.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE REFUTATION OF THE VIEW
THAT ALL OBJECTS ARE ETERNAL

(*sarva-nityatva-nirākaraṇa-prakaraṇa*)

IX. On the Refutation of the view that No Object is a Single Entity

Bhāṣya

Here is another of the views subscribing exclusively to a single alternative—

Sūtra 34

> [Objection] Every object is [a collection of] separate entities, because a 'term indicative of an object' (*bhāva-lakṣaṇa*) denotes [only a collection of] separate entities, [and not a single entity]. //iv.1.34//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] All objects are [only collections of] separate entities. There is no object which is a single entity. Why ? Because a term indicative of an object denotes [only a collection of] separate entities. [The expression *bhāva-lakṣaṇa* means] what is indicative of an object or what speaks of [an object], i.e. the 'term used for naming an object' (*samākhyā-śabda*) by which an object is indicated. [No object can be viewed as a single entity], because such a term speaks of [only a collection of] separate entities. All the terms used for naming an object express only a collection [of separate entities]. Thus, the term *kumbha* used for naming [a jar] expresses nothing but a collection [of the qualities of] smell, taste, colour and touch as well as a collection [of the different component parts like] the lower portion, the sides, the neck and so on. This [i.e. the term *kumbha*] is spoken of only as an instance. [That is, every term points to a collection of qualities and different component parts only, and as such, no object is to be viewed as a single entity.]

Sūtra 35

> [Answer] No [i.e. the opponent's contention is not justified], because a single entity can be produced 'as endowed with many [kinds of] characteristics' (*aneka-lakṣaṇaiḥ=aneka-*[*vidha*]*-lakṣaṇaiḥ*). //iv.1.35//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The compound in the expression *aneka-lakṣaṇaiḥ* is one in which the middle term is elided. [Thus, in the present case, the term *vidha* is elided.]

[The opponent's view is not tenable], because a single entity [in the form of a jar] is produced as related to the qualities of smell etc. as well as the different component parts like the lower portion etc. A substance is something quite distinct from the qualities and the 'whole' also is something quite distinct from the component parts. [That is, a substance, being something over and above a mere aggregate of qualities and different component parts, cannot be viewed as a collection of separate entities.] The argument for both these conclusions has already been explained. [cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.14, ii.1. 36 and iii.1.62]

Moreover—

Sūtra 36

> [Answer continued] [The view that an object is a single entity] is not refuted due to the very fact that a term indicative of an object refers specifically to [a single entity]. //iv.1.36//

Bhāṣya

[Answer continued] There is no ground for [the opponent's] denial, namely that no object is a single entity. Why ? Because of the very fact that a term indicative of an object refers specifically to [a single entity]. [It is observed that] a term indicative of an object— which is nothing but a word used for naming it— refers specifically to a single entity, [as, for instance, when one says], "I touch a jar which I saw previously, I see the same jar as I touched previously." [In such cases], one does not perceive just an aggregate of atoms. Thus, a mere aggregate of atoms is not really the object of the perception, and as such, that which is perceived must be a single entity.

Elucidation

Explaining the implication of Gautama's answer here, Vātsyāyana says that a term used for indicating an object refers specifically to a single entity, and not to several ones, for after perceiving a jar, first with the visual sense and next with the cutaneous sense, one has the feeling 'I touch a jar which I saw previously', but not 'I touch the entities (called by the name 'jar') which I saw previously'.

Besides, if a jar is viewed to be nothing but a collection of the qualities of colour, smell, taste and touch, it cannot be perceived by the visual or the cutaneous sense, because the visual sense can perceive no quality other than colour and the cutaneous sense can perceive no quality other than touch. It is to be admitted, therefore, that there is an entity over and above the mere aggregate of qualities, which can be perceived equally by both the visual and the cutaneous senses. Thus, the word 'jar' (*kumbha*) cannot be taken as referring to a collection of several entities.

Moreover, the opponent even has to admit the fact that one perceives a jar. But a jar, as an object of perception, cannot be a mere aggregate of atoms, for an aggregate of atoms, just like an individual atom, is imperceptible. A jar, therefore, must be a single and distinct entity.

Bhāṣya

[Objection] It has also been maintained [by the Buddhists] that there is no object which is a single entity, because [every object] represents an aggregate (*samudāya*). [Answer] If there be no single entity, there can also be no aggregate. [Objection explained] There is no object which is a single entity, because a term denoting an object is used to express only an aggregate [of several entities]. [Answer explained] [In the Buddhist view], no single entity being logically possible, an aggregate too cannot be logically justified, for an aggregate is only a collection of several single entities.

Thus, because of contradiction, the thesis that there is no single entity, [but only an aggregate] is not logically tenable. The very thing [i.e. a single entity] —the denial of which constitutes [the opponent's] thesis—is actually admitted [by the opponent] when [he] puts forward [the following] as [his] ground : 'because a term denoting an object is used to express only an aggregate', for an aggregate is only a collection of several single enities. [That is, the statement of the thesis is contradicted by the statement of the ground.] And, again, on the basis of an aggregate [i.e. as admitting the reality of an aggregate], [the opponent] makes a statement [of the ground]—viz. because a term denoting an object is used to express only an aggregate ; but, afterwards, [the opponent denies the existence of] each individual member constituting an aggregate by [stating the thesis that] there is no object which is a single entity. [That is, the statement of the ground is contradicted by the statement of the thesis.]

Thus, there being contradiction in both ways, the view [of the Buddhists] is a 'mere trifle' (*yat-kiṃcana-vāda*).

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE REFUTATION OF THE VIEW THAT NO OBJECT IS A SINGLE ENTITY

(*sarva-pṛthaktva-nirākaraṇa-prakaraṇa*)

X. On the Refutation of the view that All Objects are Non-existent

Bhāṣya

This, again, is another of the 'views subscribing exclusively to a single alternative' (*ekānta-vāda*)—

Sūtra 37

> [Objection] All is non-existent (*abhāva=asat*), because, among the positive entities, the mutual absence of one in the other is proved. //iv.1.37//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] All the objects [as are supposed to be] positive entities are [really] non-existent. Why? Because, among the positive entities, the mutual absence of one in the other is proved. 'A cow, as identical with a horse, is non-existent, 'A cow is not a horse', 'A horse, as identical with a cow, is non-existent', 'A horse is not a cow'—in this way, a term denoting a positive entity and an apprehension (*pratyaya*) in the form 'it is non-existent' or [a term] negating [the reality of a thing] are observed to have 'grammatical agreement' (*sāmānādikaraṇya*) and as such, all objects must be non-existent.

Elucidation

Vācaspati Miśra says that the view refuted here is a thesis of the Sūnyavādins who contend that the real essence of all objects is constituted by *śūnyatā*, and not by existence (*sattā*) ; the objects appear to be existent only due to false imagination. Phaṇibbūṣaṇa, however, comments that the view discussed in the present section, also known as *asad-vāda*, advocates the total unreality of objects and hence, it can in no way be concerned with the 'real essence of an object'. Besides, according to *asad-vāda*, only one alternative is definitely proved, which is : all objects are unreal. According to *śūnya-vāda*, however, none of the four alternatives—(i) an object is real (*sat*), (ii) an object is unreal (*asat*), (iii) an object is both real and unreal (*sad-asat*) and (iv) an object is neither real nor unreal (*na-sat-na-asat*)—can be logically established.

The opponent contends that the statements 'a cow is not a horse' and 'a horse is not a cow' clearly indicate that what is called a cow represents actually the non-existence of a horse and what is called a horse represents actually the non-existence of a cow. In this way, every object in the world—representing the non-existence of something else—becomes unreal or absolutely non-existent, for non-existence which has 'no real essence of its own' (*niḥsvarūpa*) means unreality and whatever is proved to be of the nature of non-existence is to be viewed as unreal. In short, the objects, their cognitions, and the practical activities based on them are all unreal and hence, there is nothing real or existent in the world.

Explaining the underlying implication of the opponent, Vātsyāyana says that all objects are proved to be non-existent on the ground that there is *sāmānādhikaraṇya* between a term indicating a positive entity and the term *asat* which signifies absolute non-existence. When two terms having different signification of their own coalesce in applying to the same object, there is *sāmānādhikaraṇya* between them, and such *sāmānādhikaraṇya* points to the identity of the two entities signified by the two terms. In the expression *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* (the jar is blue), for instance, the terms *nīla* and *ghaṭa*—meaning respectively 'what is characterised by the blue colour' (*nīla-rūpa-viśiṣṭa*) and 'an earthen object with a peculiar neck etc.'—refer to the same substance and leads to a knowledge in the form 'the jar is not at all different from what is characterised by the blue colour' (*nīla-rūpa-viśiṣta-abhinno ghaṭaḥ*). In the same way, the expression *asan gauḥ* (*aśvātmanā*) [a cow is non-existent (as identical with a horse)] shows that there is *sāmānādhikaraṇya* between the terms *go* (cow) and *asat* (non-existent), which, again, proves that a cow is identical with what is really non-existent. Applying the same argument to the other so-called positive entities, it is to be concluded that all objects are non-existent.

In describing the opponent's standpoint, Vācaspati Miśra adds further that a positive entity cannot be admitted, because it can be included in the category of neither the eternal nor the non-eternal. If a positive entity is said to be eternal, it cannot really exist. Existence (*sattā*) means 'capability of performing some function' (*kāryakāritva*). But an eternal entity cannot be accepted to be the cause of an effect due to the absurdity of the effect being produced—not in a fixed order—but always. If, again, a positive entity is said to be non-eternal, its 'being subject to destruction' is to be considered as an 'essnetial property' (*svabhāva*), for, otherwise, nothing would be capable of destroying it. What is blue can never be reduced to what is yellow only because the essential property of one is absent in the other. Such an admission, however, leads to the conclusion that a positive entity is subject to destruction even on the very moment of its production, for an essential property (destructibility in the present case) must characterise its substratum *always*. Thus, to admit that a positive entity is subject to destruction *always* is to accept that it is non-existent.

Bhāṣya

[Vātsyāyana's answer to the opponent] [The view of the opponent is] illogical, because there is contradiction between the two terms comprising the statement of thesis [viz. *sarvam abhāvaḥ*], and also, between the thesis and the ground.

[The first form of contradiction is explained as follows.] The term *sarva* signifies the countlessness (*aśeṣatā*) of the innumerable objects and the term *abhāva* signifies the denial of positive entities [i.e. the absolutely non-existent]. The former [signifies] what is 'characterised by an essential property of its own' (*sopākhya*) and the latter what is 'without any real essence of its own' (*nirupākhya*). But then, how can an object which is characterised by an essential property be [equated to] the non-existent which is without any real essence of its own? In fact, the non-existent which has no real essence of its own can never be put forward in a thesis as being characterised by the characteristics of 'innumerability' (*anekatva*) and 'countlessness' (*aśeṣatā*). [That is, whatever is signified by the term *sarva* must be existent, for it must be characterised by the properties of innumerability and countlessness, which would constitute its own essential nature. The term *abhāva*, on the other hand, signifies the absolutely non-existent or unreal which can have no essential nature of its own and can never be a substratum of the properties like innumerability and countlessness. Thus, the two terms *sarva* and *abhāva*, being contradictory in signification, cannot coalesce in referring to an identical entity and is incapable of forming a logical proposition.]

[Objection] If it be argued that the term *sarva* [even signifies] the non-existent? That is, [if it be argued that] whatever you consider to be the signification of the term *sarva* is also non-existent [and not existent as you wrongly suppose]? [Answer] Even then, the contradiction is not removed. No awareness in respect of the non-existent—characterising it as 'innumerable' or 'countless'—is possible. But there is, in fact, an awareness in respect of what is [signified by the term] *sarva*, [characterising it as 'innumerable' and 'countless']. Hence, what is [signified by the term] *sarva* cannot be non-existent.

There is moreover contradiction between the thesis and the ground. The thesis is the denial of positive entities [expressed by] the statement 'all is non-existent', and the ground is [expressed by] the statement 'because, among the positive entities, the mutual absence of one in the other is proved'. The thesis 'all is non-existent, since the mutual absence of the positive entities in one another is established' is stated only after admitting and taking up as the basic argument 'the mutual absence of the positive entities in one another'. Now, if [the opponent really accepts as true the thesis that] all is non-existent, the ground

—viz. because, among the positive entities, the mutual absence of one in the other is proved—cannot be justified, [for, positive entities being totally unreal, the question of their mutual absence etc. does not arise]. Again, if [the opponent really accepts as true the ground]—viz. because, among the positive entities, the mutual absence of one in the other is proved, the thesis that all is non-existent cannot be justified, [for the opponent has in fact admitted the reality of the positive entities as he speaks of their mutual absence].

[The refutation given above] is [to be understood] as related to the following *sūtra* also [i.e. the view of the opponent is refuted not only by Vātsyāyana's own argument given above, but also by that of Gautama himself as given below]—

Sūtra 38

> [Answer] No [i.e. all objects are not non-existent], because the positive entities—as endowed with the essential properties of their own—are proved [to be existing]. //iv.1.38//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] [First interpretation of the *sūtra.*] All is not non-existent. Why ? Because the positive entities exist as endowed with 'their own essential properties' (*svabhāva*). Indeed, the thesis that the positive entities exist as endowed with their own essential properties has been put forward [and established with arguments by the Naiyāyikas.] [The opponent's thesis is thus contradicted by an established thesis and, therefore, does not stand logically.] What, then, are the essential properties of the positive entities ? [The essential properties] shared commonly by substance, quality and action are the universals like existence (*sattā*) etc., and those shared exclusively by substance are the possession of movement etc. Again, [of the nine substances], earth exclusively possesses the qualities ending with touch [i.e. the qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch]. In this way, there is an unlimited variety of every [substance, quality and action]. Similarly, specific properties [qualifying the positive entities like] universals, particularity and inherence also are perceived.

[Now, if all objects are accepted to be non-existent], such difference in the essential properties which correctly indicates [the real and specific nature of each object] would not be possible, because the non-existent can have no essential property of its own. However, the fact is that there is such [difference in the essential properties of substance etc.]. Therefore, [it cannot be said] that all is non-existent. [That is, it is a fact established by observation that there are different positive entities having specific essential properties of their own. But, if the positive entities are considered to be absolutely non-existent, they can be characterised by no such properties and this goes against the general uncontradicted experience that various positive entities in the form of substance etc. exist as endowed with their own essential properties.]

[Second interpretation of the *sūtra.*] Or, the *sūtra*—viz. *na svabhāva-siddher bhāvānām*—means 'no, [all is not non-existent], because [the positive entities in] their 'own specific nature' (*svarūpa=svabhāva*) are proved [by right cognition]. To explain, when the word *go* (cow) is uttered, what one understands by it is a particular substance as characterised by a particular universal [i.e. a cow characterised by cowness], and not merely what is absolutely non-existent. If all objects were non-existent, one would have merely understood, by the expression *gauḥ*, something non-existent and the word *go* would have signified only the non-existent. Since, however, on the utterance of the word *go,* one understands actually a particular substance only, and not anything non-existent, [the view of the opponent that all is non-existent] does not stand logically.

[Third interpretation of the *sūtra*] Or, [the implication of the *sūtra,* viz.] *na svabhāva-siddher* etc. [is as follows]. [While explaining his view], the opponent says 'a cow, as identical with a horse, is non-existent' ; but, why does he not say '[a cow], as identical with a cow', [is non-existent] ?' Since he cannot say so, it follows that a cow, as identical with a cow, exists really and [it is proved that a cow] as characterised by its properties exist actually. Again, [while explaining his view], why does not the opponent say 'a horse is not a horse' or 'a cow is not a cow' [instead of saying 'a horse is not a cow' or 'a cow is not a horse'] ? Since he cannot say so, it is established that a substance as characterised by its own essential properties exists really.

When the 'relation of identity' (*avyatireka*) is negated, there can be 'grammatical agreement' (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) between a positive entity and an awareness in the form 'it is non-existent'. The term *vyatireka* [in the compounded word *a-vyatireka*] means the relations of conjunction etc. [which subsist only between two different entities]. Thus, the word *avyatireka* here signifies a relation [opposite to the relations of conjunction etc.] which is known as the relation of identity [and does not subsist between two different entities]. And when such a relation [or some other relation like that of conjunction etc.] is negated, there can be grammatical agreement [between a positive entity and] an awareness in the form 'it is non-existent', as for instance, in the statement 'plums are not existing in the pot' [which negates—not the reality of the plums—but only the relation of conjunction between the plums and the pot]. The statements 'a cow, as identical with a horse, is non-existent' and 'a cow is not a horse' only imply that there is no identity between a cow and a horse, and thus, they only negate [the possibility of] the relation of identity as subsisting between a cow and a horse. When such a relation is negated, there can be grammatical agreement between the positive entity 'cow' and an awareness in the form 'it is non-existent', which is expressed by the statement 'a cow, as identical with a horse, is non-existent'; just as, there occurs grammatical agreement between the positive entity 'plum' and an awareness in the form 'it is non-existent', when the relation of conjunction between the plums and the pot is negated. [In short, the contention that the positive entities do not really exist, because they have grammatical agreement with the term 'non-existent', is not logical, for such agreement only implies the absence of the relation of identity, and not the unreality of objects.]

Elucidation

After explaining the implication of Gautama's *sūtra* in three different ways, Vātsyāyana lastly refutes the opponent's argument based on grammatical agreement or *sāmānādhikaraṇya* as described under *sūtra* 37 above.

Sūtra 39

> [Objection] [The positive entities] as endowed with their own essential properties are not proved [to be real], because [such entities and their essential properties] are only conditional (*āpekṣika*). //iv.1.39//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] 'Conditional' (*āpekṣika*) means what is due to some [extraneous] condition, [and not natural]. The existence of the long is conditioned by the short [for it is not considered long by itself] and, again, the existence of the short is conditioned by the long [for it is not considered short by itself]. In fact, there is no entity that can be said to exist as endowed with its own essential properties. Why? Because [the existence of the positive entities and their own essential properties] is due only to the strength of some condition. Therefore, the [real] existence of the positive entities as endowed with their own essential properties is not proved.

Elucidation

Whatever is conditional is observed to be unreal, as for instance, the red colour in a piece of crystal placed near a red flower. Similar is the case with the so-called positive entities and their essential properties, they have no real existence since they are always conditional.

Sūtra 40

> [Answer] [The above argument based on the conditional existence of objects] is illogical, because there is contradiction. //iv.1.40//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] If [the existence of] the long be conditioned by the short, [the existence of] the short must be unconditional, and, then, what would be the condition in relation to which the short would be known as the short ? If, on the other hand, [the existence of] the short be conditioned by the long, [the existence of] the long must be unconditional, and, then, what would be the condition in relation to which the long would be known as the long ? [That is, the opponent has to admit the unconditional existence of either the long or the short. Hence, his ground, namely, the conditional existence of all objects, is contradicted.]

Thus, [in fact], the rule of conditional existence itself is unjustified, because, of the two entities mutually dependent on each other [for their respective existence], the absence of either results in the absence of both. [That is, the long and the short are said to depend on each other for their respective existence. There would thus be mutual dependence—the long would not exist unless the short exists already and the short would not exist unless the long exists already, and hence, the existence of neither the long nor the short would be proved.]

Moreover, if the existence [of the long, the short etc.] be never natural [but only conditional], how is it that, of two substances equal or atomic in magnitude, the one is not [considered] long or short conditionally [i.e. in relation to the other] ? The two substances [with equal magnitude] are identical irrespecitive of whether [their existence] is [admitted to be] conditional [i.e, conditioned by or relative to some third substance, longer or shorter] or unconditional [i.e. in relation to each other themselves]. Thus, the same two substances [of equal magnitude] which are considered conditional [from one point of view] are also considered unconditional [from a different point of view], but neither of them has any disparity [in magnitude]. But if they [i.e. two substances of equal magnitude] also were conditional, there would have been produced some other specific magnitude in either of them. [That is, according to the opponent, all entities are conditional. Thus, two substances of equal magnitude, though not conditional in relation to each other, are to be considered conditional in relation to some other third substance of a different magnitude. But it is proved, by the instance of the long and the short, that two conditional entities have different magnitude and hence, there follows the absurdity that, of the two substances equal in magnitude, either would be characterised by a different magnitude since they also are conditional.]

[Opponent's query] But, then, what is the utility of a condition ? [Vātsyāyana's answer] [The utility of a condition] lies in justifying the perception of greater magnitude when two objects [of different magnitude] are perceived. When one sees two objects [of different magnitude at the same time], one perceives the greater magnitude persent in one of them and ascertains it to be 'long', and the other object which one perceives to be of a lesser magnitude is ascertained to be 'short'. And herein lies the utility of a condition. [That is, the condition has nothing to do with the existence of the long or the short. It is required only for ascertaining the difference in magnitude between the two.]

Elucidation

Uddyotakara indicates a number of inconsistencies involved in the view that all is non-existent. First, the opponent is to be asked, is there any real *pramāṇa* proving the thesis that all is non-existent ? If the opponent answers in the affirmative, his thesis would be contradicted and, if he answers in the negative, his thesis would remain without any real proof. Secondly, does the opponent's statement—viz. all is non-existent—convey any real sense ? If it does, the real existense of that sense at least is to be accepted, and, if it does not, it would be as useless as delirious talk. Thirdly, the opponent has to admit the reality of at least two persons, one who communicates the thesis that all is non-existent and another to whom the said thesis is communicated, for no statement can ever be made in the absence of two such persons. Fourthly, the opponent even has to admit that there is a real difference in the meanings of the two statements 'all is non-existent' and 'all is existent'. Thus, the thesis of the opponent can be justified in no way.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE REFUTATION OF THE VIEW THAT
ALL OBJECTS ARE NON-EXISTENT

(*sarva-śūnyatā-nirākaraṇa-prakaraṇa*)

XI. On the Refutation of the view that there is only a specific Number of Objects

Bhāṣya

Now, the following 'views each declaring that there is only a specific number of objects [in the world]' (*saṃkhyaikānta-vāda*) [are being noted]. First, all objects are of one kind only, because no object is other than what is existent (*sat*). Second, all objects are of two kinds only, because they are divided into the two classes of the eternal and the non-eternal only. Third, all objects are of three kinds only, namely, [of the nature of] knower, knowledge and object of knowledge. Fourth, all objects are of four kinds only, namely, [of the nature of] a knower who has a right cognition (*pramātṛ*), an instrument of a right cognition (*pramāṇa*), an object of a right cognition (*prameya*) and a right cognition (*pramiti*).There are many other similar views as may be found [in different philosophical works.] The critical examination [of the above views] is as follows.

Sūtra 41

[Neither of] the *saṃkhyaikānta-vāda*-s is established, because, [according to them], [the independent existence of] the proof (*kāraṇa*=*sādhana*) can be neither accepted nor denied logically. //iv.1.41//

Bhāṣya

If the 'thing to be proved' (*sādhya*) and its proof (*sādhana*) be different from each other, an exclusive number [of objects] would not be established, because of the distinctness [of the proof]. If, again, the thing to be proved and its proof be not different from each other, then also, an exclusive number [of objects] would not be established, because of the absence of [an independent] proof, and no thesis can ever be established without adequate proof.

Elucidation

Gautama refutes all the four *saṃkhyaikānta-vāda*-s with a single argument. His contention is that the followers of none of these views can admit the existence of an independent proof for their theses, for such an admission would mean the acceptance of a different or additional entity—in the form of the proof—which can be included in neither of the categories sought to be established, due to the fact that the thing to be proved (e.g. fire) is always distinct from what is offered as the proof (e.g. smoke). If, on the other hand, they do not admit the existence of some independent proof, their theses would remain unproved, because of the absence of a valid ground. For instance, according to the first one of the four views described by Vātsyāyana, all objects are of one kind only. Thus, no second kind of object being possible, whatever may be offered as the proof can never be distinct from what is sought to be proved, namely, a single kind of objects. In the same way, according to the second view, the thing to be proved is represented by the two kinds of objects, eternal and non-eternal. The admission of an independent proof would then mean the admission of an entity which is neither eternal nor non-eternal, and this would contradict the opponent's own thesis.

Sūtra 42

> [Objection] No [i.e. the *saṃkhyaikānta-vāda*-s are not unproved], because the proof is only a part (*avayava*) [of the thing to be proved]. //iv.1.42//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The *saṃkhyaikānta-vāda*-s are not unproved. Why? Because the proof is only a part [of the thing to be proved]. Some part [of the thing to be proved] itself is [accepted] to be the proof and as such, there is no difference [between the thing to be proved and the proof, and the question of admitting some other distinct entity does not arise]. Similar is the case of [the views admitting] the duality of objects etc. also.

Sūtra 43

> [Answer] The ground [mentioned in the previous *sūtra*] is not a proper ground, because there can be no part [of the thing to be proved]. //iv.1.43//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The ground—namely, because the proof is only a part [of the thing to be proved]—is not a proper ground. Why? Because [the opponent] speaks of the oneness [of objects] by putting forward the thesis 'all is one,' in which all the objects—excluding none—are taken into consideration, and it is not logically possible that there is anything really different from ['all objects'] which can be offered as the proof. [That is, all possible entities are included in the thing to be proved, viz. all objects as characterised by oneness, and there is really no part or object left that can be said to be different and be offered as an independent proof.] Similar is the case of [the views admitting] the duality of objects etc. also.

Moreover, if these *saṃkhyaikānta-vāda*-s seek to reject the difference in the various objects which is due to [the difference in] their specific properties, they would be reduced to some false theories only, because of their contradiction with perception, inference and verbal testimony, [which establish that there are different objects in the world]. If, on the other hand, they only admit that the objects are collected under a single head because they share some common property and, again, that the objects are viewed as different because each of them possesses some specific property of its own they have to surrender their adherence to one single alternative.

All these views advocating an exclusive number of objects only are critically examined here for 'properly explaining' (*praviveka*) the 'right knowledge [of the categories]' (*tattvajñāna*).

Elucidation

In the concluding lines, Vātsyāyana points out the reason why the *saṃkhyaikānta-vāda*-s are discussed here in the context of the critical examination of rebirth. The right knowledge of the twelve *prameya*-s, which is said to be the direct cause of liberation, means the right understanding of the twelve *prameya*-s as characterised by their own respective specific properties, and not by any property which they may happen to share in common with other entities. Accordingly, the right knowledge of rebirth would be possible only if it is established as a distinct *prameya* as characterised by some specific peoperty of its own. It is, therefore, necessary to establish that there are different objects in the world, each characterised by some specific property of its own and it has been done here by refuting the veiws that speak of an exclusive number of objects only.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE REFUTATION OF THE VIEW THAT THERE IS ONLY A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF OBJECTS

(*saṃkhyaikānta-vāda-nirākaraṇa-prakaraṇa*)

XII. On the Critical Examination of Result

Bhāṣya

After [the completion of the critical examination of] rebirth, result [is now to be critically examined]. Regarding result—

Sūtra 44

> There is doubt, because the result is produced sometimes immediately and sometimes in a later period. //iv.1.44//

Bhāṣya

When one cooks or milks [a cow], the results, namely, boiled rice and milk, appear immediately. But when one ploughs [the field] or sows [seeds], the result, namely, the acquiring of corn occurs in a later period. Now, there is this particular rite [as spoken of in the Vedic injunction] 'one desirous of attaining heaven should perform the Agnihotra rite', and there is doubt regarding the result to be produced by the performance of this rite [viz. Is the result of the Agnihotra rite produced immediately or in a later period ?].

[The result of the Agnihotra rite] is not immediately [produced], because the result is to be experienced in a later period (*na sadyaḥ, kālāntaropabhogyatvāt*).[1] The result [of the Agnihotra rite] is heard to be [the attainment of] heaven. It is, however, possible only when the present ordinary body is destroyed and there is produced a different [and special body fit for inhabitancy in the heaven]. Hence, [it is concluded] that the result is not produced immediately. Similar is the case with the result of the [Vedic] rites [viz. the Sāṃgrahaṇī etc.] performed by one desirous of acquiring a village etc. [That is, the results of all Vedic rites are produced, not immediately, but in a later period].

Sūtra 45

> [Objection] [The result of the Vedic rites] cannot be produced in a later period because

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[1] The expression *na sadyaḥ* etc. represents evidently a *sūtra* of Gautama and it is accepted to be so by Uddyotakara, Udayana and Viśvanātha. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, prefers to read it as a part of the *bhāṣya* since the *Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha* does not record it as a *sūtra*.

> of the destruction of the cause [i.e. because of the absence of the act of performing a rite]. //iv.1.45//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] When the actions themselves are destroyed, the results due to those actions cannot be produced because of the absence of the causes. Nothing indeed is ever produced from a cause which is destroyed. [Similarly, the results of the Vedic rites too cannot be produced in a later period, long after the absence of the rites themselves.]

Sūtra 46

> [Answer] The result of [the Vedic rites], so long as it is not produced, would be just like the products (*phala*) of a tree. //iv.1.46//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] One desirous of obtaining the products of a tree, for instance, performs the various 'preparatory acts' (*parikarman*) like pouring water at the root of the tree and others. After these preparatory acts have been duly completed, the element of earth being reduced to a [peculiar kind of] mixture by the element of water, and undergoing transformation due to the action of internal heat produces a 'liquid substance' (*rasadravya*). The liquid matter in the form of the substance which permeates the tree and undergoes transformation due to the action of heat assumes various specific compact shapes and brings about [in the tree] different products like the leaves etc. And thus, the acts of pouring water etc., become successful [i.e. produce the intended result]. It is not that the products appear simply from what is destroyed [viz. the preparatory acts completed long before].

In the same way, the different actions [of the living beings] produce impressions (*saṃskāra*) in the form of virtue (*dharma*) and vice (*adharma*). The impressions thus produced and assisted by other co-operating causes [like specific points of time and space etc.] bring about the result in a later period. It has also been noted [by Gautama himself in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.2.60] : 'it is produced due to connection with the results of actions previously performed'.

Elucidation

The pouring of water at the root of a tree is admitted to be a cause for the production of the fruit, even though the fruit appears long after the performance of the said act. The pouring of water is not a direct (*sākṣāt*) cause for the production of the fruit, it helps in bringing about the fruit in an indirect way by producing a peculiar liquid substance which ultimately brings the fruit into existence. In the same way, the Vedic rites produce their results—not immediately—but in a later period through the mediation of *dharma* and *adharma* which are ditectly produced by the performance of the rites and, being assisted by other co-operating causes, bring about the results even in the absence of the rites themselves.

Bhāṣya

But this result [said] to be produced [in a later period] would be—prior to its production—

Sūtra 47

> [Objection] Neither non-existent nor existent, nor even both existent and non-existent, because the existent and the non-existent are absolutely dissimilar in nature. //iv.1.47//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] An effect [*niṣpatti-dharmaka*, lit. what is characterised by origin] is not non-existent before its production, because there is a specific rule concerning the material cause [of every effect]. [The specific rule is]: for the production of each particular effect some particular material only is to be obtained, and not anything and everything [can be taken up as the material] for each and every effect. If the effect be non-existent [prior to its production], such a specific rule cannot be justified.

[An effect] cannot also be existent [before its production], because it is illogical [to speak of] the production of an effect that exists already prior to its production.

Nor can [an effect] be both existent and non-existent [before its production], because the existent and the non-existent are absolutely dissimilar in nature. 'Existent' implies the acceptance of [the reality of] an entity, while 'non-existent' implies the rejection of [the reality of] an entity. Thus, the existent and the non-existent are absolutely dissimilar in nature, i.e. they are contradictory to each other and, due to contradiction, there can logically be no identity between the two.

Elucidation

Though the term *phala* primarily means the feelings of pleasure and pain, it can also be applied, in a secondary sense, to the body etc. which are the means for experiencing pleasure and pain. Thus, in fact, as Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out, the term *phala* here is to be taken in the sense of simply an effect or a product, and there is no incongruity in Gautama's opening the critical examination of *phala* with reference to the attainment of the resulfs of Vedic rites.

In the present *sūtra*, the implied contention of the opponent is that, of the three possible alternatives—(i) it is existent, (ii) it is non-existent and (iii) it is both existent and non-existent, none can be true in respect of an effect prior to its production. This, however, indicates that an effect is something unreal and the cause-effect relation too is a figment of imagination. Thus, ultimately, there remains no scope for the critical examination of *phala*.

The contention of those advocating the pre-existence of an effect is that there is a specific rule concerning the material cause of every 'positive product' (*bhāva-padārtha*). For making an earthen jar, for instance, one takes up, as the basic material, only a lump of clay and not some threads, while for a piece of cloth only some threads and not a lump of clay. This is true of all other positive products and it is thus established that every positive product has, as its own basic material, some specific kind of substance only. If, however, an effect is said to be absolutely non-existent prior to its production, such a specific rule cannot be justified, and anything and everything may be the cause of each and every effect. An earthen jar, for instance, in spite of being absolutely non-existent prior to its production is admitted to appear out of a lump of clay. But, then, what is there to prevent the appearance of a piece of cloth—also absolutely non-existent prior to its production—out of the same lump of clay ?

In fact, the followers of Sāṃkhya have put forward the theory—known as *sat-kārya-vāda*—that an effect is existent prior to its production. According to them, production (*utpatti*) means the manifestation (*abhivyakti*) or emergence (*āvirbhāva*) of an effect already existing. Prior to such production, an effect remains latent in the material cause in a very subtle form. The material cause of a particular effect is constituted by the particular substance in which that particular effect remains latent. Thus, a piece of cloth appears out of the threads only and not a lump of clay or anything else, since it remains latent in a very subtle form in the threads, which are its material causes.

Bhāṣya

The truth in this regard is that an effect is non-existent before its production. Why ?

Sūtra 48

[Answer] Because the production and the destruction [of an effect] are actually observed. //iv.1.48//

Elucidation

From the comments of Udayana, Viśvanātha and Rādhāmohana Gosvāmin, it appears that the introductory remarks preceding the present *sūtra* (given here as *Bhāṣya*) are considered by them to be a part of the *sūtra* itself. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, differs and comments that Vātsyāyana here gives his explanation beforehand and brings in the *sūtra* afterwards without adding anything thereunder. Besides, the reading of the *sūtra* adopted here (*utpāda-vyaya-darśanāt*) agrees with that of the *Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha* and the *Nyāya-sūtroddhāra* also.

Bhāṣya

As against the contention that an effect is non-existent before its production, since there is a specific rule concerning the material cause [of every effect], [Gautama answers]—

Sūtra 49

[Answer] That the effect is non-existent before its production is, however, 'proved by actual experience' (*buddhi-siddha*). //iv.1.49//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] This particular [object] only is capable of producing this particular [effect], and not anything and everything—in this way, an effect, even prior to its production, is proved, by actual experience, to have a fixed cause, for a specific rule regarding the production of an effect [viz. an effect is produced only from a fixed cause of its own] is actually observed. Accordingly, the specific rule concerning the material cause [of an effect] is justified. If the effect were already existing even prior to its production, it cannot be produced at all.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana explains the present *sūtra* as a refutation of the view that because of the specific rule concerning the material cause of an effect, an effect is to be viewed as existing even before its production. According to him, the implication of the *sūtra* is that, on the basis of the generally observed fact that a particular effect can be made of a particular stuff only, it is established that a particular kind of stuff or material only has the capability of producing a particular kind of effect, and such a cause-effect relation can be ascertained even if the effect be really non-existent prior to its production. Thus, the basis of the specific rule concerning the material cause of an effect is, not the pre-existence of the effect, but only the observed capability (*sāmarthya*) of some specific stuff (or material) in producing some specific effect. A piece of cloth, for instance, is always observed or proved to be produced from threads and never from a lump of clay or anything else. This indicates that threads alone have the capability or potency (*śakti*) of producing a piece of cloth and hence, one desirous of making a piece of cloth collects threads invariably and nothing else. Such a practice has, in fact, nothing to do with the prior existence of a piece of cloth.

The various arguments for and against the Sāṃkhya theory of *sat-kārya-vāda* may briefly be noted here.

First, if the effect be really non-existent prior to its production, the effect can never be produced at all, for nothing can bring the non-existent into existence. Not ~~even~~ a thousand artisans, for instance, can turn the blue into the yellow. To this, the Naiyāyika answers that it is true that an absolute non-entity—a lotus blooming in the sky, for instance—can never be brought into existence. But an effect is not an absolute non-entity, for it is non-existent *before* production, but existent *after* production. Thus, an effect is characterised successively by both the properties of non-existence (*asattva*) and existence (*sattva*;—so long as it is not produced, it is characterised by the former and from the moment it is produced to the moment it is destroyed, it is characterised by the latter. In fact, the prior non-existence of the effect cannot be denied even by the advocates of *sat-kārya-vāda*. They argue that, just as oil is contained in seasumum or milk in the udder of a cow, the effects like the jar etc. too pre-exist in a lump of clay etc. and when they are said to be produced they only emerge out of their causes. But, then, it may be asked, do these instances really substantiate the opponent's stand ? It is true that oil *as oil* or milk *as milk* pre-exists in seasumum or the udder of a cow. Still, can even the opponent claim, for instance, that the same jar as it is perceived to be after its production or as is used by one for collecting water pre-exists in a lump of clay? If it be so, what would be the real meaning of such expressions as 'a jar is not yet produced', 'a jar will be produced' and so on? In other words, it is to be admitted that a jar *as a jar* does not exist in its material cause prior to its production and it is characterised by the property of non-existence so long as it is not brought into existene.

Secondly, it is to be admitted that there is a necessary relation between a cause and its effect. Only that which has a necessary relation with a particular effect is capable of producing that effect. Otherwise, what is there to prevent the production of a piece of cloth from a lump of clay or the production of a jar from a number of threads? The presece of such a relation, however, proves nothing but the pre-existence of the effect. There can be no relation between the existent and the non-existent, for a relation is never possible in the absence of either of the relata (*sambandhin*). Thus, a necessary relation between a cause and an effect can be justified only on the admission that both of them are existent, that an effect exists even prior to its production, as intimately connected with its cause. One may try to deny such a relation by conetending that every cause is characterised by some specific potency (*śakti*) on the strength of which a particular cause produces some particular effects only and not all. Even then, it is to be noted, the pre-existence of the effect is not disproved, for a necessary relation between the effect and the specific potency resident in the cause is to be admitted instead. If the specific potency resident in a lump of clay—which admittedly has no relation with an effect in the form of a piece of cloth—is said to have no relation with an effect in the form of a jar also, what would be the basis for the specific rule that a jar alone—and not a piece of cloth too—comes out of a lump of clay? Thus, to justify the said specific rule, one has to admit a necessary relation between the potency and the effect—to justify which, again, one his to admit also the pre-existence of the effect.

In answer to all these, the Naiyāyikas argue that since the effect is not an absolute non-entity, there can be a relation of the cause with the effect in spite of its absence prior to production. From the moment a (positive) effect is produced, there subsists, between the effect and its material cause, the 'relation of inherence' (*samavāya-sambandha*). Such a relation which determines the material cause and the effect respectively as the substratum (*ādhāra*) and the superstratum (*ādheya*) is not possible in the absence of the superstratum or the effect. But this does not imply a total absence of relation between the cause and its non-existent effect, for on the basis of inference, it is established that a particular kind of object is produced by another particular kind of object only and thus, the general relation of being an effect to a cause is well-proved between two entities even before the one is actually produced by the other. In other words, the effect is said to be related to the cause, since it is the locus of an 'effect-hood conditioned by the cause-ness resident in (a particular) cause' (*kāraṇa-gata-kāraṇatva-nirūpita-kāryatva*) and such an effect-hood would act as the relation for the effect. Similarly, the cause is said to be related to the effect, since it is the locus of a 'cause-ness as conditioned by the (said) effect-hood' (*kāryatva-nirūpita-kāraṇatva*) and such a eause-ness would act as the relation for the cause. Such relations—unlike the relations of conjunction and inherence—do not characterise the relata as substratum-superstratum and hence, they can relate even what would be produced in a later moment. Besides, it cannot be argued that an object to be produced in the future can have no relation with any other existing object. Every piece of knowledge is admitted to have a relation with the object it reveals, for, otherwise, each and every piece of knowledge would have revealed each and every object. Thus, for instance, when a person has knowledge regarding his inevitable future death, there must be some relation between the knowledge and its object, namely, future death. Such a relation, again, presupposes the pre-existence of future death, which, however, can hardly be accepted, for it leads to an absurd position, namely that a living person is dead already.

Lastly, the material cause and its effect are essentially identical. A jar and a piece of cloth, for instance, is proved, ultimately, to be nothing different from a lump of clay and a cluster of threads which are their material causes. Thus, since the material cause exists even before the production of the effect, the effect too—being essentially identical with the material cause—cannot be totally absent prior to its production. Such a contention, however, is refuted by the Naiyāyikas on the ground that the material cause and the effect are established to be different on the strength of perception. It is, in fact, proved by observation that a jar with its peculiar configuration is something quite distinct from a lump of clay out of which it is shaped ; they are understood to be identical only because an effect always inheres in—i.e. is inseparably connected with—its material cause. Nor does the fact that both a lump of clay and a jar made of it share the same universal of earthness (*pṛthivītva*) disprove the individual distinction between the two, for, in that case, one would be faced with the absurdity that all objects are identical, since all of them equally share the universal of provability (*prameyatva*). Besides, a jar and a lump of clay are proved to be different on the ground that they serve quite different ends, the former helps one in collecting water but the latter does not.

Arguing from the Sāṃkhya standpoint, Vācaspati Miśra (under *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, verse 9) says that a cluster of threads and a piece of cloth are not proved to be different in spite of their serving different ends, because even the same object can serve different ends under different circumstances. A palanquin-bearer cannot carry the palanquin individually, though he can act as a guide for the road. The same bearer, however, can carry the palanquin when other bearers join him. In the same way, the threads taken singly cannot cover anything ; yet, when they jointly form a piece of cloth they can serve that purpose. It is to be noted, however, that the instance does not disprove the Nyāya standpoint. The bearers can carry the palanquin jointly, though they are not inseparably linked with one another. A cluster of threads, however, can cover an object only when they are conjoined with one another in some specific way—and not arbitrarily—as constituting a compact and distinct entity in the form of a piece of cloth. That is why the threads when clustered together in the shape of a ball, for instance, cannot serve as a covering for anything. Thus, the distinction between the threads and their effect, a piece of cloth, can hardly be denied.

As a further argument against the theory of *sat-kārya-vāda*, the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṃsakas point out that if every effect be really pre-existing, even the manifestation of the effect—an effect itself—must be pre-existing and thus, a causal operation would be simply useless. If both a piece of cloth and its manifestation exist already in the threads, there would remain nothing that can be accomplished by the causes. Nor can it be argued that the causal operation would be necessary for the manifestation of the effect's manifestation itself, because, in that case, one would have to admit further and further manifestations for each successive manifestation and there would follow the fallacy of infinite regress.

Vācaspati Miśra (*op. cit.*) raises some objections against the view of the prior non-existence of the effect. First, if every effect be really non-existent before production, the production (*utpatti*) itself of the effect too must be non-existing and one would have to admit a further production of that production itself. Again, on the same ground, further and further productions would have to be admitted for each successive production and there would be no escape from the fallacy of infinite regress. One may try to avoid the fallacy by maintaining that the production of the jar is something identical with the jar itself and hence, the question of a further production of the production does not arise. Such an admission, however, leads to another difficulty. In this view, statements like 'the jar is produced' etc. involve tautology and become meaningless, because, the jar and its production being identical, the use of only either of the terms 'jar' and 'produced' would suffice. Secondly, even admitting a distinction between the effect and its production, the Naiyāyikas have to define production only as the inherence of the universal of existence (*sattā*) in the effect. Inherence, however, is admitted to be eternal and thus, production of the effect too becomes eternal. What then, would be the necessity of a causal operation according to the Naiyāyikas themselves ?

The answers to the above are as follows. First, even if the production of the jar etc. be admitted as a form of inherence which is eternal, the causal operation would be necessary for bringing the jar etc. themselves into existence, which are non-eternal and absent prior to their production. Secondly, production may also be defined as a temporal 'relation with the first moment of existence' (*ādya-kṣaṇa-sambandha*) and such a relation is really identical with the effect. Thus, the success of the causal operation would lie in making such a relation a possibility. The charge that, on the identity of the effect and its production, statements like 'the jar is produced' etc. involve tautology is not justified, because the terms 'jar' and 'produced', though referring to the same object (*dharmin*), characterise it quite differently—the former as a locus of the property of jar-ness (*ghaṭatva*) and the latter as that of the property of produced-ness (*utpannatva*).

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa lastly notes that the theory of *sat-kārya-vāda* has been elaborately discussed and criticised by Uddyotakara and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. The arguments for *sat-kārya-vāda* given by Vācaspati in the *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī*, however, have been refuted only by Śrīdharācārya in his *Nyāya-kandalī*.

Sūtra 50

[Objection] [The argument, given in *sūtra* 46 above, that the result of the Vedic rites would be] just like the products of a tree is not a proper ground, because [in the case of the result of Vedic rites] there is a total change of the substratum. //iv.1.50//

Bhāṣya

[Objection) Both the preparatory acts like pouring water at the root of the tree etc. and the products [i. e. the results in the form of leaves, fruits etc.] have for their substratum the same tree. However, the Vedic rites are performed by one in this world [through an ordinary and worldly body], while the results are enjoyed in the other world [through a special and heavenly body]. Thus, there being a total change of the substratum, [the instance of the products of a tree] does not establish the intended thesis.

Sūtra 51

[Answer] [The refutation given in the preceding *sūtra*] is not a proper refutation, because the pleasure [produced by the performance of Vedic rites] inheres in the self. //iv.1.51//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Pleasure [produced by the performance of Vedic rites] inheres in the self, because it is [internally] perceived by the self. And also, the [immediate] result [of the Vedic rites]—known as virtue (*dharma*)—inheres in the same self, because virtue is [admitted to be] a quality of the self. Therefore, the charge of there being a total change of the substratum is not justified.

Elucidation

The implication of Gautama's answer is as follows. Heaven (*svarga*) which is said to be the result attained by the performance of Vedic rites like Agnihotra etc. actually means a blissful state or the constant enjoyment of pleasure which is a quality inhering in the self alone. Besides, the good *adṛṣṭa*-s, also known as *dharma*, which are the immediate results of the performance of Vedic rites and ultimately lead to the attainment of heaven etc. reside in the self alone. Thus, the same eternal self which, in this world, is characterised by *dharma* produced by the performance of Vedic rites, is characterised, in the other world, by the pleasure produced by the same. The charge of a total change of the substratum, therefore, is not tenable.

Sūtra 52

> [Objection] No [i.e. the said charge cannot be set aside by saying that pleasure is the result of the performance of Vedic rites], because the results [of the performance of Vedic rites] are prescribed to be a son, a wife, an animal, clothes, gold and food etc, //iv.1.52//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The results [of the preformance of Vedic rites] are said to be a son and the like—and not pleasure ; as for instance [in the injunctions] 'one desirous of a village should perform a [Vedic] rite', 'one desirous of a son should perform a [Vedic] rite' and so on. Therefore, what has been said [in the preceding *sūtra*]—that the result [of the performance of Vedic rites] is pleasure—is illogical. [Thus, the results attained by the performance of Vedic rites, a son etc., cannot reside in the self].

Sūtra 53

> [Answer] They [i.e. a son and the like] are mentioned as the results in a figurative sense, because the [actual] result [i.e. pleasure] is produced through association with them. //iv.1.53//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The result in the form of pleasure is produced through association with a son and the like, and hence, a son and the like are said to be the results only in a figurative sense. As for instance, [in the scriptural saying] *annaṃ vai prāṇāḥ* (food is the very life), the word *prāṇa* (life) is used to mean *anna* (food) [in a figurative sense, because food is the cause of life].

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF RESULT

(*phala-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

XIII. On the Critical Examination of Suffering

Bhāṣya

[In the list naming the *prameya*-s], suffering (*duḥkha*) has been mentioned next to result and it has also been said [in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1, 21] "suffering is of the nature of pain". But, then, [the opponent asks], does this imply the rejection of pleasure (*sukha*) which is internally perceived by each individual self and is experienced by all living beings, or any other alternative [viz. the admission of pleasure] ? To this, [Gautama] answers that [he accepts] the other alternative. Why ? Because it is not possible to deny [the reality of] pleasure which is proved on the basis of the direct experience of all the living beings.

However, the characterisation of the body etc. as suffering [cf. under *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 21] is [to be understood] only as a precept—for one who has attained a state of complete indifference due to suffering resulting from one's being subject to a continuous stream of births and deaths, and is desirous of driving away suffering [for good]—prescribing that [the body etc.] are to be meditated upon as suffering only, so that [on the strength of such meditation] one may attain final deliverance from suffering. On what ground [are the body etc. characterised as suffering only] ? All the different forms of living organism, all the regions in which they are born [viz. the fourteen *bhuvana*-s from *satyaloka* to *avīci*] and all forms of the recurring birth are inseparably connected with suffering. Thus, because of their invariable connection with suffering, [the body etc.] are referred to, by the sages, as nothing but suffering which is of the nature of pain.

It has been prescribed [that the body etc.] are to be meditated upon as suffering only. In this regard, the ground is given by [Gautama himself in the following *sūtra*]—

Sūtra 54

> The production of the body etc. [*janman*, etymologically, that which is born] is suffering only (*eva*), because it is invariably attended with different kinds of pain. //iv.1.54//

Bhāṣya

The word *janman* [in the *sūtra*] means what is born, i.e. the body, the senses and the mind. And 'production' means the appearance of the body etc. as characterised by some distinct form [i.e. in the form of some living being].

Pain, again, is of different kinds—mild (*hīna*), moderate (*madhyema*) and severe (*utkṛṣṭa*). [The pain experienced by] those condemned to hell is severe; [the pain experienced by] the animals is moderate; [the pain experienced by] the human beings is mild; and [the pain experienced by] the gods as well as those free from attachment is milder [than that experienced by the human beings]. Thus, finding that all the regions in which [the living beings] are born are inseparably connected with different kinds of pain, a person specifically determines that pleasure as well as the means [for obtaining it], namely, the body, the senses and the mind, are to be looked upon as suffering only. Next, because of specifically determining [that the body etc.] are to be looked upon as suffering only, he has the knowledge—with regard to [the pleasure etc.] attainable in all the different worlds [viz. the fourteen *bhuvana*-s]—that 'these [pleasure etc.] do not constitute my desirable ends' (*anabhirati*). When he repeatedly meditates upon the knowledge that 'the pleasure etc. do not constitute my desirable ends', he becomes free from the craving for the enjoyment of pleasure in respect of all the different worlds and due to a total annihilation of the cravings for the enjoyment of pleasure, he is delivered from all forms of suffering. This is similar to the case of one who ascertains some quantity of milk to be nothing but poison due to its contamination by poison, does not take it up [for drinking] and, because of not taking it up [for drinking], does not have to suffer death.

However, [the omission of pleasure] and the inclusion of suffering only [in the list enumetaring the twelve *prameya*-s] are not [to be taken as] the rejection of pleasure. Why? [Gautama answers]—

Sūtra 55

> No [i. e. the reality of pleasure cannot be denied], because pleasure too is produced in the 'intermediate periods' (*antarāla*). //iv.1.55//

Bhāṣya

The mention of suffering alone [in the list enumerating the twelve *prameya*-s viz. *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.9] does not imply the rejection of pleasure. Why? Because pleasure too is produced in the intermediate periods. It is a fact that in the intermediate periods of [the productions of] sufferings, there is produced pleasure which is internally perceived by all the living beings. Therefore, [the reality of] pleasure cannot be denied.

Moreover—

Sūtra 56

> [The reality of pleasure] is not denied [by the express mention of suffering only], because the sufferings of a living being never come to an end [until liberation] due to defect [in the fulfilment of his] 'longing for' (*paryeṣaṇa*) [an object of pleasure]. [That is, suffering alone is expressly stated to indicate the fact that there is no end to one's suffering until liberation.] //iv.1.56//

Bhāṣya

The expression '[the reality] of pleasure' and 'by the express mention of suffering alone' are implied by the context. [Thus, they are to be added for completing the sense of the *sūtra*.] The word *paryeṣaṇa* means 'longing for', i. e. the craving for acquiring an object of pleasure. Defect [in the fulfilment of one's] longing for [an object of pleasure] is [as follows] : a living being, after determining an object as conducive to pleasure, strives for obtaining it, but he may not at all attain the desirable end, or even if the desirable end be attained, it may soon be destroyed, or what he attains may fall short of what is actually expected, or he may attain the desirable end only after strenuously removing many serious obstacles. From such defect [in the fulfilment of one's] longing for [an object of pleasure], there result various kinds of mental torments. Thus, the sufferings of a living being never come to an end [until liberation] due to such defect [in the fulfilment of his] longing for [an object of pleasure]. And there being no cessation of suffering, it is prescribed that [pleasure and the body etc.] are to be meditated upon as suffering only. The body etc. are described as suffering only for this reason and not because of a total absence of pleasure.

Moreover, as it has been declared [by the sages], "whenever a particular desire of a person who longs for acquiring an object of pleasure is fulfilled, he is immediately tormented by some other [new] desire" and "a person hankering after wealth is not satisfied by his wealth, even if he acquires—along with cows and steeds—the whole of the earth stretching, on all sides, upto the sea. What happiness (or pleasure) is there in seeking after wealth ?"

Sūtra 57

[The body etc. are characterised as nothing but suffering], also because [ordinary people] wrongly consider the various forms of suffering as pleasure. //iv.1.57//

Bhāṣya

It has been prescribed that [pleasure and the body etc] are to be meditated upon as suffering only. An ordinary person bent upon the enjoyment of pleasure alone thinks [wrongly] that pleasure is the highest goal of human life, that there is no other ultimate good except pleasure, and when he attains pleasure, he considers that the mission of his life is fulfilled, that he has accomplished what a human being ought to achieve [in the human life]. Due to false deliberation, he gets firmly attached to pleasure and the means for obtaining it—viz. the objects of enjoyment ; being so attached, he strives for attaining pleasure and ultimately, there are produced various kinds of suffering due to birth, old age, diseases, death, obtaining what is not desired, separation from what is desired and not receiving what is sought after. And he wrongly considers all these kinds of suffering to be pleasure only. Suffering is indeed an inseparable part of pleasure, for it is impossible to obtain pleasure without being afflicted by suffering. Thus, due to such 'invariable dependence' (*tādarthya*) [of pleasure on suffering], an ordinary person [wrongly ascertains suffering as pleasure in the form] 'it [i.e. suffering] is only pleasure' and having his critical faculty impaired by such a false notion [identifying suffering with pleasure], he runs through [the process of] recurring births and deaths, and can never move out of the [bondage of] worldly existence. For this reason, as a repellent to the wrong notion identifying [suffering with] pleasure, it has been prescribed that [pleasure and the body etc.] are to be meditated upon as suffering only. Thus, the body etc. are described as suffering only due to their inseparable connection with suffering and not because of a total absence of pleasure.

[Objection] If it be so, why has it not been simply said [in *sūtra* 54 above] that 'the body etc. are suffering' [instead of 'the body etc. are suffering *only*'] ? However, Gautama, though he should have said 'the body etc. are suffering', actually says instead 'the body etc. are suffering *only*', and this fact indicates a total absence of pleasure. [Answer] The word 'only' (*eva*) has been added to indicate that [the highest goal of human existence] is the total suppression of the [recurring] births. [That is, one constantly looking upon the body etc. as suffering would strive for freeing oneself from these bondages and ultimately, attain liberation. Otherwise, one would remain attached for ever to this world of miseries.] Why? Because the body etc. are not essentially (*svarūpataḥ*) suffering ; they are [said to be suffering] in a secondary sense only. Similar is the case with pleasure [i.e. pleasure too is characterised as suffering in a secondary sense only]. The body etc. also are produced due to [the actions of] the living beings themselves. Still, they are not [essentially identical with] suffering. [That is, they are said to be suffering in a secondary sense, for they are invariably attended with suffering.]

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SUFFERING

(*duḥkha-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

XIV. On the Critical Examination of Liberation

Bhāṣya

[In the list enumerating the *prameya*-s], liberation [has been mentioned] next to the mention of suffering. It [i.e. liberation] is sought to be denied [by the opponent in the following way]—

Sūtra 58

> [Objection] There can be no liberation [for a living being], because [of his] 'inseparable relation' (*anubandha*) with debts (*ṛṇa*), afflictions (*kleśa*, viz. attachment, aversion and ignorance) and activities (*pravṛtti*). [That is, no living being can absolutely detach himself from the bonds of debts etc. and hence, liberation is an impossibility]. //iv.1.58//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] [First], there can be no liberation because of [a living being's] inseparable relation with debts [to (i) the seers, (ii) the gods and (iii) the forefathers]. The debts are [as referred to in the *śruti*]: "a Brahmin 'as soon as he is born' (*jāyamāna*) is born as under debts 'with [three kinds of] debt' (*ṛṇaiḥ*). He [becomes free from] the debt to the seers by observing celibacy, from that to the gods by performing sacrifices and from that to the forefathers by producing offsprings" [cf. *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* of the *Kṛṣṇa-yajurveda*, 6.3.10]. An inseparable relation with these [debts] means relating them to one's own different actions [i.e. performing, during one's whole life-time, the various actions with a view to freeing oneself from all these debts]. for such a relation with [one's] different actions is recommended by *śruti* [as in the following precepts]: "the sacrificial rites which are known as the Agnihotra, the Darśa and the Pūrṇamāsa are [to be performed as long as one is not rendered incapable by] old age or death" and "one is released from the obligation of performing these sacrificial rites only in old age or death" [cf. under commentary on *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-darśana*, ii.4.4.]. Thus, due to an inseparable relation with the debts [i.e. because of one's whole life-time being absolutely taken up by the performance of actions for freeing oneself from the debts], one would find no spare time for [performing the actions leading to] liberation [viz. listening to the *śāstra*, meditating upon the truths revealed by the *śāstra* and so on]. Consequently, there can be no liberation.

[Secondly], there can be no liberation because of [a living being's] inseparable relation with afflictions. [It is observed that] a living being dies as inseparably bound by afflictions and, again, is born also as inseparably bound by afflictions. The absence of its relation with the afflictions is in fact never observed. [As such, a living being can never be liberated.]

[Thirdly], there can be no liberation because of [a living being's] inseparable relation with activities. A living being—from the moment he is born to the moment he dies—is not observed [even for a moment] to be free from exertions through speech, body and mind. [As such, he cannot be liberated.]

Thus, what has been said [under *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.2]—viz. liberation is attained through right knowledge, when each previous one in the series of 'suffering, birth, activity, evil and false knowledge' is removed as a consequence of the removal of the one immediately preceding it—is not logically justified.

The answers to the above are now being stated [by Gautama in the following *sūtra*-s]. As to the objection that [there can be no liberation] because of an inseparable relation with debts, [it is answered] that the expression 'with [the three kinds of] debt' (*ṛṇaiḥ*) [in the *śruti* quoted by the opponent] means really [in a figurative sense] 'with what resembles the debts' (*ṛṇair iva*). [As Gautama himself says]—

Sūtra 59

> [Answer] The word [i.e. the word *ṛṇa* in the expression *ṛṇaiḥ*] in its primary meaning cannot be justified and as such, the reiteration (*anuvāda*)[1] [by the *śruti*] has been made with the word in a figurative sense [i.e. the word *ṛṇa* is to be taken in a figurative sense]. [The reiteration has been made with the word *ṛṇa* in a figurative sense], because, in that case, censure (*nindā*) and praise (*praśaṃsā*) can be justified. //iv.1.59//

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[1] The *śruti* quoted here by the opponent belongs to the class of *anuvāda* or reiteration. For details of such classification, see under *Nyāya-sūtra* ii.1.62ff.

Bhāṣya

[Answer] [The word *ṛṇa*] in the expression *ṛṇaiḥ* is not a word in its primary meaning, because it is generally observed to be applied when one [viz. the borrower] gives back what is to be repaid, and in such cases alone, the word *ṛṇa* is [to be taken] in its primary meaning. [That is, the primary meaning of the word *ṛṇa* is the money one borrows from another and is to be repaid.] This is, however, not possible in the present context [i.e. in the *śruti* quoted by the opponent]. Thus, [it is established that] the word [*ṛṇa*], being unjustifiable in its primary meaning, the reiteration [by the *śruti*] has been made with the word [*ṛṇa*] in a figurative sense; that is, the expression *ṛṇaiḥ* (with debts) is equivalent to the expression *ṛṇair iva* (with what resembles debts). [The implication of the *śruti*, therefore, is—not that a Brahmin, when born, is bound with actual debts—but that he is under the strict obligation of performing certain acts which resemble the repayment of debts].

And this [expression *ṛṇaiḥ*] is one containing an unexpressed simile, as is the expression 'the boy [newly initiated into celibacy] is fire' (*agnir māṇavakaḥ*). That is, the word *ṛṇa* which is observed to be used primarily in some other sense [viz. borrowed money] is here [i.e. in the *śruti*] used [in the figurative sense of what resembles a debt], just as [in the expression *agnir māṇavakaḥ*], the word *agni* [which primarily means fire] is used [in a figurative sense] in respect of a boy [to imply that the boy resembles fire, that he is as full of vigour as a glowing fire].

Why has the reiteration been made with the word in a figurative sense? Because, in that case, censure and praise can be justified. Just as a person in debt, if he does not repay the borrowed money, is censured [by people] so also [a Brahmin], if he fails in his duties [viz. the observance of celibacy, the performance of the Agnihotra rite etc. and the production of offsprings], is censured. Again, just as a person in debt, if he repays the borrowed money, is praised [by people], so also [a Brahmin], if he rightly performs his duties, is praised. And this is the underlying implication of the simile.

The word *jāyamāna* also [occurring in the *śruti* and meaning literally 'a just-born baby'] is to be taken as a word in a figurative sense, because, if construed in the opposite manner [i.e. if the primary meaning is taken], [one—a just-born baby—would] not at all be entitled [to the performance of the duties]. [That is, the primary meaning of the word *jāyamāna* is one who is just coming out of the mother's womb or a just-born baby who is not entitled to the performance of any duty. Thus, the word cannot be taken in its primary meaning, because the prescription of duties in respect of a just-born baby would be simply meaningless]. To explain, the word *jāyamāna* occurring in the *śruti*—*jāyamāno ha vai brāhmaṇaḥ* etc. [a Brahmin as soon as he is born etc.], is to be taken as a word in a figurative sense—[a Brahmin is characterised as] 'being born' (*jāyamāna*) when he becomes a householder (*gṛhastha*). [Thus, the word *jāyamāna* means figuratively a householder]. Only when a Brahmin becomes a householder, he gets entitled to the performance of the prescribed duties, for a baby which has just come out [of the womb] of its mother is not entitled [to the performance of any duty].

A baby which has just come out of its mother's [womb] is not entitled to the performance of the duties, because only a person who can be a supplicant [for some desired object] and also has the ability [to perform the necessary action] is entitled [to the performance of the duties]. Only a person who can be a supplicant [for some desired object] is entitled to the performance of the duties, for in the injunctions prescribing the rites, the attainment of a desired end is heard of [i.e. is spoken of], as in the case of the injunctions 'a person desirous of attaining heaven should perform the Agnihotra rite' and the like. Moreover, only a person who has the ability [to perform an action] can engage himself [to the performance of the rites etc.]. Only a person who has the ability [to perform an action] is entitled to the performance of the duties, for he alone can engage himself [to the performance of the rites etc.]. Indeed, only a person who is really capable engages himself to the performance of the prescribed duties, and not others. In respect of the primary meaning of the word *jāyamāna* [viz. a just-born baby] both of these are absent. That is, in respect of a baby that has just come out of its mother's [womb], neither of the two [conditions] —viz. being a supplicant [for some desired object] and the ability [to perform an action]—can be fulfilled.

Moreover, the 'scriptural statements' (*vaidika-vākya*) are not essentially different from the 'statements in ordinary discourse' (*laukika-vākya*), because both are composed by persons who are guided by critical judgment. Even an ordinary person, who has not acquired a critical faculty [by studying the *śāstra*-s], does not say in respect of a baby that is just-born 'study [the scriptures], perform the sacrifical rites and observe celibacy'. When guided by the desire of advising [the living beings], how, then, can a seer who always speaks logically and without any fault advise, [in an absurd way, a just-born baby to perform the rites etc.]? A dancer never goes on to dance [to entertain] a blind man, nor a singer a deaf one. [Thus, the *śruti* quoted by the opponent—which speaks of the performance of certain duties—can be rightly interpreted, only if the word *jāyamāna* is taken in a figurative sense].

Again, the object for advice must be a person who can comprehend the meaning of what is advised. An advice is given to only such a person as can rightly comprehend the signification of what is advised. This [i.e. the ability to comprehend the signification of the precepts of the seers] is not possible in the case of a just-born baby. [The word *jāyamāna*, therefore, is not to be taken in its primary meaning].

Besides, the *mantra* and the *brāhmaṇa* portions [of the Veda] speak of duties which have [a connection with] the indicative sign of the stage of a householder [i.e. have a connection with a wife]. The duties spoken of by the *mantra* and the *brāhmaṇa* portions [of the Veda] are related to the indicative signs of the stage of a householder, namely, the possession of a wife etc. Therefore, it is only a householder who is [figuratively] signified by the word *jāyamāna* [and the word cannot be taken in its primary meaning].

And the *śruti*—viz. [one is to perform the sacrificial rites until one is rendered incapable by] old age or death—can have relevance [for one] so long as one's supplication is not transformed. So long as a person's supplication [i.e. desire] for attaining a desirable result is not transformed, i.e. does not cease to exist, one has to perform constantly the prescribed duties. Thus, in relation to such a person only, the *śruti* that [one is to perform the sacrificial rites until one is rendered incapable by] old age or death can have relevance. [That is, it is not prescribed that one is to perform rites during one's whole life-time ; one has to perform them only so long as one's longing for attaining the particular results does not cease. Thus, one free from all desires for attaining worldly pleasures, but desirous of attaining liberation only, may perform the functions conducive to liberation only, without engaging oneself in the performance of the sacrificial rites like the Agnihotra etc.]

The *śruti*—viz [one is released from the obligation of performing the sacrificial rites] only in old age—refers to the fourth [and final] stage [of one's life] when one becomes a wandering mendicant. It has been said [by the *śruti*] that one is released from this [i.e. the obligation of performing the sacrificial rites] only in 'old age' *jarā*). The word *jarā* here means the fourth [and final] stage of one's life-span (*āyus*) when one becomes a wandering mendicant, for it is prescribed that in that stage [i.e. the fourth stage] one should adopt the life of a wandering mendicant. [If the implication of the *śruti* is taken to be that one has to perform the rites] constantly, without any respite [during the whole life-time], the expression 'only in old age' becomes meaningless. Nor can it be logically maintained that [the implication of the *śruti* is] that one is released [from the obligation of performing the rites] when one is incapacitated, because [the scripture] sanctions the [employment of] external help for a person who is himself incapable of performing the rites, [as in the following *śruti*-s] : 'Or, the pupil should make oblations [representing his preceptor], because he is [as if] purchased [by the preceptor] in exchange of [the teaching of] the Veda [to the pupil]' and 'Or, the priest making oblations with milk [i.e. an Adhvaryu or a priest well-versed in the *Yajurveda*] should make oblations [representing the actual sacrificer or the *yajamāna* who is himself incapcitated], because he is, [as if] purchased in exchange of the priestly fee. [That is, if a person is himself incapable, he can perform the rites through his representative. For instance, a pupil indebted to the preceptor for his education may act for the preceptor in a sacrificial rite. Hence, it is illogical to conclude that one is released from the obligation, if one is rendered incapable.]

But, then, is this *śruti* [viz. a Brahmin as soon as he is born etc. (*jāyamāno ha vai* etc.)] to be taken as the reiteration of what has already been prescribed [by some other independent *śruti*] ? Or, is its meaning to be construed according to one's will [i.e. is it to be taken as an independent injunction prescribing something not already prescribed] ?

[The answer is] that it would be logical to take it [i.e. the said *śruti*] as the reiteration of what has already been prescribed. Thus, the 'semantical competency' (*sāmarthya*=*yogyatā*) [of the words in the *śruti*] would be made possible [by interpreting the meaning as] 'the householder, being under strict obligation, just like one in debt, engages himself to the performance of the duties'. [That is, if the word *jāyamāna* is taken, not in the figurative sense of a householder, but in the primary sense of a just-born baby, the *śruti* would be as meaningless as the expression 'one sprinkles with fire' because of the absence of semantical competency] One's [physical] efforts concern, not the result [viz. the attainment of heaven], but the means producing the result [viz. the rites of Agnihotra etc.], and when the means have been properly accomplished, they lead to the intended result. Duties to be performed [by a householder] have been prescribed prior to [the *śruti* '*jāyamāno ha vai*' etc.] and are also being prescribed subsequent to [the same *śruti*]. Thus, the word *jāyamāna* signifies one [i.e. a householder] who is related to all the duties [mentioned prior to and subsequent to the said *śruti*]. [The word *jāyamāna* means primarily a just-born baby, and figuratively, a householder. Though the self of the baby has the potentiality of attaining heaven, the baby itself is simply unable to accomplish the means, i e. to perform the rites of Agnihotra etc. Hence, in respect of the baby, the *śruti* cannot be an independent injunction. Besides, it has been already pointed out that the word *jāyamāna* cannot be taken in its primary meaning. However, duties to be performed by a householder have been prescribed by other statements occurring both before and after the particular *śruti* under discussion. Hence, in respect of the householder also, it cannot be an independent injunction ; it becomes a reiteration of what is prescribed by others.]

[Objection] If it be argued that there is no explicit statement prsecribing [the adoption of the life of a wandering mendicant in the fourth and final stage of one's life] ? [Answer] No, because there is also no explicit injunction prohibiting [the adoption of a mendicant's life].

[Objection explained] [The adoption of] the life of a householder only is explicitly enjoined by the *brāhmaṇa* [portion of the Veda]. If there were any other stage of life [in addition to the stage of a householder], it would have been explicitly enjoined. Since there is no explicit statement prescribing [any other stage of life], there must really be no other stage of life [except that of a householder]. [Thus, one can never adopt the life of a wandering mendicant and escape from the performance of the rites, since it is not sanctioned by the Veda. One would have to remain a householder as long as one lives and consequently, must perform the prescribed sacrificial rites during the whole life-time and would have no opportunity for attaining liberation, because one would have no spare time to perform the actions leading to it.]

[Answer explained] No [i.e. the objection does not stand], because there is also no explicit injunction prohibiting [the adoption of a stage of life other than that of a householder]. Indeed, the *brāhmaṇa* [portion of the Veda] does never explicitly enjoin the prohibition [of the adoption of the other stages of life by declaring] that 'there is no other stage of life, the stage of a householder is the only stage of life'. The view of the objector is illogical, inasmuch as no injunction explicitly prohibiting [the adoption of the other stages of life] is ever heard.

Besides, [the *brāhmaṇa* portion] gives injunctions [concerning the stage of a householder only], because it has authority [over that stage of life only]; as is the case with the other branches of learning. Just as, each of the other branches of learning explicitly enjoins rules [regarding such objects or topics only] as each has authority over and [they do not speak of other objects or topics beyond their jurisdiction], not because there is no other objects [or topic], so also the *brāhmaṇa* portion which is a 'work enjoining rules for the householder' (*gṛhasthaśāstra*) explicitly prescribes [on that topic or stage of life only] over which it has authority, [and it does not speak of the other stages of life], not because there is no other stage of life [except that of a householder].

Now, a few 'Vedic verses' (*ṛc*) and 'Vedic passages' (*brāhmaṇa*) that speak of liberation are being stated. Indeed, there are many Vedic verses and passages that speak of liberation. The verses are as follows :

(i) The seers who desired offsprings and wealth were subjected to death (i.e. rebirth) [again and again] by their actions. But the other seers having real wisdom attained immortality which lies beyond actions [i.e. which can be attained after forsaking all actions].

(ii) The [wise and learned] seers attained immortality—neither by actions, nor by offsprings, nor by wealth—but only by renouncing actions. And the ascetics (*yati*) enter into [Brahman] which is beyond ignorance, lies outside the scope of the ordinary means of knowledge and shines forth [in its own lustre].

[*Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā* 31.18, *Taittirīya-āraṇyaka* 3.12.7, *Kaivalyopaniṣat*, pt.i, 2.3 and *Nārāyaṇopaniṣat*]

(iii) I know that great person, of the colour of the sun, [reigning] beyond darkness. By knowing him alone one passes beyond death [i.e. is liberated] and there is no other path that may lead one [to that state of freedom]. [*Śvetāśvataropaniṣat* 3.8]

The Vedic passages [referring to liberation] are as follows :

(i) *Dharma* is divided into three groups. The first group comprises [those who] perform the sacrificial rites, study [the scriptures] and make gifts. The second group comprises [those who] practise penance. The third group comprises [those who] practise celibacy, reside in the preceptor's house and, living there during the whole of their life, finally exhaust themselves in the preceptor's house. All of them [i.e. those attached to the above groups] attain 'holy abodes' (*puṇyaloka*) [after death]. But only 'one who is absorbed in the contemplation of Brahman' (*brahmasaṃstha*) attains immortality. [*Chāndogyopaniṣat* 2.23]

(ii) People adopting the life of a wandering medicant 'renounce all actions' (*pravrajanti*, literally, adopt a wandering life), only being desirous of attaining such a world [i.e. a world in which the self is absolutely free]. [*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 4.4.22]

(iii) After describing, [in the following passage], that 'worldly existence' (*saṃsaraṇa*) is due to actions—"And some other wise people say that a person is full of desires ; he puts in efforts according as he desires ; he performs an action according as he puts in efforts, and an action which he thus performs becomes fruitful [*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 4.4.5]," [the scripture] describes the real point [in a further passage] : "Such a person who is full of desires [is bound by worldly existence]. Hence, a person who is free from all desires [is not bound by worldly existence]. The life-breath (*prāṇa*) of a person who has no desire, who is free from all desires, who has passed beyond all desires never moves upward [i.e. such a person does not die like an ordinary man] ; he becomes identical with Brahman itself and attains Brahman' [*op. cit.* 4.4.6].

Thus, the contention [of the opponent] as stated [under *sūtra* 58 above] —that there can be no liberation because of an inseparable relation with debt—is illogical.

[Besides,] the contention that there is only one stage of life is also illogical, because there is heard [a scriptural saying referring to] the four stages of life, namely, 'the four paths that lead to the abode of gods' [*Taittirīyasaṃhitā* 5.7.23].

And the *brāhmaṇa* passage—that the sacrificial rites which are known as the Agnihotra, the Darśa and the Pūrṇamāsa are [to be performed as long as one is not rendered incapable by] old age or death—[has relevance for] only a person who is desirous of a result. [Thus, a person who is free from worldly desires is not obliged to perform the said sacrificial rites and remains free to perform the functions leading to liberation.] How? [Gautama answers]—

Sūtra 60

> [Answer continued] The refutation [by the opponent that there can be no liberation due to an inseparable relation with debts] is not justified, because [the scripture speaks of] the super-imposition (*samāropaṇa*) [of fire] on the self [of a person who is going to renounce the world]. //iv.1.60//

Bhāṣya

[Answer continued] It is heard [i.e. is enjoined] in the scripture that a Brahmin should go away [i.e. renounce the world] after he has performed the sacrificial rite called the Prājāpatya, has given away all his worldly possessions [as the sacrificial fee in it] and laslty, has superimposed the fires on his self. From this statement we clearly understand that such super-imposition [of fires on the self] has been prescribed in respect of only a person all the desires of whom have ceased as a consequence of his attaining freedom from the [three kinds of] longings (*eṣaṇā*)—namely, for offsprings, for wealth and for worldly fame.

There are *brāhmaṇa* passages too confirming [the above conclusion]: "Wishing to take up a different life [i.e. a life different from that of a householder—viz. the life of a religious mendicant], [the sage] Yājñavalkya said to [one of his wives], 'O Maitreyi ! I wish to go away from this place [i.e. I wish to forsake my present life of a householder and take up the life of a religious mendicant]. [If you like], I would divide my wealth between you and [my other wife] Kātyāyanī' and also, 'You have thus been instructed [by me on the true nature of the self]. O Maitreyi ! this much only constitutes [the essence of] immortaliy'. So saying Yājñavalkya went away [from the house and took up the vow of a religious mendicant". [*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 4.5]

N. iv. 11/a

Elucidation

As against the objection that there can be no liberation because of an inseparable relation with debts, Vātsyāyana has already answered (under *sūtra* 59 above) that the scriptural statement *jarāmaryaṃ vā etat satraṃ yad agnihotraṃ darśapūrṇamāsau ca* has relevance for only such a person as is desirous of attaining some particular results like heaven etc. Thus, a person who has conquered all worldly desires would not be under the obligation of performing the sacrificial rites during the whole of his life and would remain free to work for his own liberation. Vātsyāyana explains the present *sūtra* as a further corroboration of this conclusion and brings out the implication of Gautama by quoting two passages from the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat*. The passages quoted clearly state that before taking up the vow of a religious mendicant one must perform a sacrifice called the Prājāpatya and give away, as the sacrificial fee, all one's worldly possessions keeping absolutely nothing for oneself. Such a total gift, however, can be made only by a person who is absolutely free from the desire for ordinary wealth and hence, it is proved that the performance of the rites like the Agnihotra etc. yielding specific results in the form of heaven etc. is binding upon only a person full of desires.

Sūtra 61

[Answer continued] Moreover, the 'rites to be performed constantly until death' (*pātra-cayānta-karman*) cannot be justified [in relation to one and all indiscriminately] and hence, there is no result [of such rites in the form of heaven etc. in respect of one who does not perform them]. [That is, the Agnihotra etc.—the rites to be performed constantly until death—are to be performed by only a person who is not free from desire and hence, such a person cannot be liberated. But a person who is absolutely free from desires and has renounced the world can never be led to the performance of a rite by the urge for attaining the results like heaven etc. Thus, he is under no obligation to perform constantly the rites of Agnihotra etc. and ultimately, becomes liberated]. //iv.1.61//

Bhāṣya

[Answer continued] If [the rites of Agnihotra etc. which are to be performed constantly until one is rendered incapable by] old age or death are assumed to be enjoined, without any discrimination, [in respect of both a person with a desire and a person without a desire], it would follow that the rites to be performed constantly until death concern everyone without any exception. In that case, however, [i.e. if it be assumed that the rites are to be performed until death by one and all], the *śruti* referring to complete freedom from [the three kinds of] longing (*eṣaṇā*) would not be justified. [The *śruti* is as follows]: "And it [i.e. the cause of renouncing the world] is this that the ancient men of wisdom did not long for offsprings. They thought, 'What shall we do with offsprings, we who have the self alone as our ultimate goal?' [Thinking thus], they attain complete freedom from the longing for offsprings, the longing for wealth and the longing for worldly fame. After this, they take up the vow of living by begging [i.e. renounce the world]." [*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 4.4] The rites to be performed constantly until death do not have any relevance for one who has attained complete freedom from the [three kinds of] longing, and hence, the result [in the form of heaven etc.] does not lead everyone, without discrimination, to the performance of a sacrificial rite. [That is, a person free from desires and having no longing for a result would not be induced to the performance of a sacrificial rite and would not be under the obligation of performing the rites of Agnihotra etc. as long as he lives].

The view that there is only one 'stage of life' (*āśrama*) [viz. the stage of a householder] is not justified, because the four stages of life are prescribed in Itihāsa, Purāṇa and Dharmaśāstra. If it be argued that these [Itihāsa etc.] have no validity? No [i e. there can be no such objection], because their validity is accepted by *pramāṇa* [i.e. *śabdapramāṇa*]. Indeed, the validity of Itihāsa and Purāṇa is accepted br *pramāṇa* in the form of the following *brāhmaṇa* passage: "the sages like Atharvan, Aṅgiras and others said about these Itihāsa and Purāṇa, 'These Itihāsa and Purāṇa represent the fifth [Veda] and they are the Veda of the other Vedas [i.e. they clarify the implication of the different Vedas]". Therefore, it is illogical to argue that these [Itihāsa etc.] have no validity. Again, if the validity of Dharmaśāstra is not admitted, there would result a complete cessation of [the performance of] the day-to-day duties of the human beings and consequently, there would follow the absurdity of an annihilation of the human society.

Moreover, absence of validity [in Itihāsa and Purāṇa] cannot be justified, because of the sameness of the seer (*draṣṭṛ*) and speaker (*pravaktṛ*) [of the Veda with that of Itihāsa and Purāṇa]. The same persons who are the seers and speakers of the *mantra* and the *brāhmaṇa* [portions of the Veda] are also [the seers and speakers] of Itihāsa, Purāṇa and Dharmaśāstra. [Thus, the validity of Itihāsa etc. is proved by the validity of Veda, for they are the compositions of the same authors.]

Also, the validity [of Itihāsa etc.] in respect of its specific subject-matter [is to be accepted], because each branch of *śāstra* has its own specific subject-matter. The subject-matter of the *mantra* and the *brāhmaṇa* [portions of the Veda] is quite different from the subject-matter of Itihāsa, Purāṇa and Dharmaśāstra. The subject-matter of *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa* is the sacrificial rites, of Itihāsa and Purāṇa the mode of people's life and of Dharmaśāstra [the formulation of] specific rules regarding the social conduct of the people. The specific rules concerning all these [different subjects] cannot be framed by one [and the same branch of *śāstra*] and hence, they [i.e. the different branches of *śāstra* in the form of Itihāsa etc.] are to be accepted as *pramāṇa* [i e. as valid] in respect of their own subject-matter, as in the case of the different sense-organs. [The visual sense is accepted as a *pramāṇa* only in the perception of colour and the auditory sense only in that of sound. Similarly, *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa* have authority over only the performance of sacrificial rites and Dharmaśāstra etc. over only the social conduct of the people. As such, the validity of neither can be denied.]

Again, [as to the objection, given under *sūtra* 58 above, that there can be no liberation] due to the impossibility of severing the connection with afflictions, [Gautama answers]—

Sūtra 62

> Liberation [as a state free from all sufferings] is proved, because there is no affliction for a person under deep sleep, when he does not experience any dream. //iv.1.62//

Bhāṣya

Just as the connections of a person—under deep sleep when he does not experience any dream—with attachment as well as pleasure and pain are severed, so also, in the state of liberation, [one becomes free from all desires and sufferings]. And, the people who know the true nature of Brahman cite this [i.e. the state of dreamless sleep] as an instance [for explaining] the nature of the liberated self.

Elucidation

In the present *sūtra*, the state of liberation is likened to the state of dreamless sleep. This, however, does not mean that the two are identical. As Vācaspati Miśra points out, in the latter state, in spite of the absence of afflictions at that particular period, the seeds (*saṃskāra*) of future afflictions are not destroyed ; but, in the former state, the seeds of afflictions are absolutely destroyed and a liberated person has to experience suffering never in future.

Bhāṣya

And, moreover, [as to the objection, given under *sūtra* 58 above, that there can be no liberation] due to an inseparable relation with activity, [Gautama answers]—

Sūtra 63

> The activities [i.e. actions] of a person who has attained freedom from afflictions do not lead to re-birth (*pratisandhāna=pratisandhi=punarjanma*). //iv.1.63//

Bhāṣya

When attachment, aversion and ignorance are absolutely destroyed, activities [i.e. the good or bad actions performed by a person] do not lead to re-birth. Re-birth means being born once again, after the previous birth [i.e. life on earth] has come to an end. Such re-birth is caused by the craving for enjoyment of pleasures. When such craving has absolutely disappeared, there is no re-birth, for, [in the absence of craving], there can be no further birth after the cessation of the previous birth, and this [i.e. a total absence of re-birth] is nothing but liberation.

[Objection] If it be argued that [in the above view] there would follow the absurdity of actions being without any result ? [Answer] No [i.e. there can be no such objection], because [the above view] does not negate [the fact of] experiencing the results of actions. It was only stated that [when craving ceases absolutely] there is no re-birth after the previous birth has come to an end ; but thereby [the fact of] experiencing the results of one's actions is not denied, for all the actions previously performed bear their results in the final birth [i.e. the birth in which one is liberated and after which there is no future birth].

Elucidation

The implication of Gautama's answer is that there can be no liberation without right knowledge. When right knowledge is produced, false knowledge or ignorance must disappear, and consequently, attachment and aversion also would be destroyed. Thus, a person who has acquired right knowledge and attained liberation would be absolutely free from the three afflictions and his actions, good or bad, would not lead to any future birth.

It may be objected to the above that, if a liberated person is not re-born, how would he enjoy the fruits of his previous actions which are yet to go into fruition? Thus, the followers of Gautama would have to accept the absurd position that a liberated person has not to enjoy the fruits of his actions which are to produce their results in future, and all this amounts to saying that one may somtimes escape the consequences of one's own actions. Vātsyāyana notes the objection and answers that the results of all previous actions are experienced by a liberated person in the final birth.

Sūtra 64

[Objection] No [i.e. the afflictions cannot be destroyed absolutely], because the stream of afflictions is natural. //iv.1.64//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Severing of the connection with afflictions is not logically justified. Why? Because the stream of afflictions is natural. That is, the stream of afflictions is beginningless and what is beginningless can never be absolutely destroyed.

Elucidation

According to Vātsyāyana's interpretation the contention of the opponent is that a living being can be free from afflictions temporarily, and not absolutely, because the continuous production of the three afflictions—attachment, aversion and ignorance—represents a process which is beginningless or going on from time immemorial, without any permanent break. Consequently, it can never come to an end and must go on forever. A living being can, therefore, never be liberated.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that the opponent's position may also be understood in a different manner. An absolute destruction of the natural attribute of an object means also an absolute destruction of the object itself. Water itself, for instance, is to be admitted as absolutely destroyed on the event of its natural property—coldness—being so destroyed. Thus, an absolute destruction of the afflictions in liberation would imply also an absolute destruction of the very self of which the afflictions are the natural attributes. Such a position, however, can never be accepted by the Naiyāyika. It is to be admitted, therefore, that, even in liberation, the self is characterised by afflictions.

Bhāṣya

To this [i.e. to the objection given under the preceding *sūtra*], someone gives [the following] answer—

Sūtra 65

> [The stream of afflictions], though natural, is non-eternal [i.e. can be absolutely destroyed], just as the non-existence [of an effect] prior to its production is non-eternal. //iv.1.65//

Bhāṣya

Just as the non-existence [of an effect] prior to its production, though beginningless, is destroyed by the effect that comes into being [later], so also the stream of afflictions, though natural, can be non-eternal.

[In answer to the same objection], someone else says—

Sūtra 66

[The non-eternality of the stream of afflictions] is just like the non-eternality of the black colour of an [earthly] atom. //iv.1.66//

Bhāṣya

Just as, the black colour of an [earthly] atom, though beginningless, is non-eternal [because of being destroyed by] conjunction with fire, so also the stream of afflictions, [though beginningless, is non-eternal, because it is destroyed by right knowledge].

[Vātsyāyana's refutation of the two answers given by others.] Eternality and non-eternality are the properties of the positive entities only. [They are applied] primarily to the positive entities, and secondarily to non-existence.

[The view that] the black colour of an earthly atom is beginningless is illogical, because there is no valid ground. There is also no ground to prove that whatever is not characterised by origin is non-eternal.

Elucidation

Refuting the first answer given by others, Vātsyāyana says that the non-eternality of prior non-existence cannot be a proper instance, because it is said to be non-eternal only in a secondary sense. The term 'non-eternal' is primarily applied to only positive entities that are characterised by both origin and destruction. Prior non-existence which is characterised by destruction only (and no origin) is thus said to be non-eternal in a secondary sense on the ground that, because of being subject to destruction, it merely resembles the really non-eternal entities. In the same way, the term 'eternal' also is applied to it in a seconary sense due to the fact that, because of having no origin (but destruction only), it merely resembles the really eternal entities (which are charactersied by neither origin nor destruction).

Refuting the second answer given by others, Vātsyāyana says that there is no ground to prove that the black colour of an earthly atom is beginningless, and hence, it cannot be cited as a proper instance. As Vācaspati Miśra explains further, there is no valid ground to establish that the black colour of an earthly atom is not at all caused, but eternal and beginningless. In fact, there is evidence to the contrary. The red colour in an earthly atom is produced by conjunction with fire, a new colour is never observed to be produced in an earthly atom so long as its black colour is not destroyed due to the action of heat. Thus, taking the new red colour as an instance, an inference proving the non-eternality of the black colour of an earthly atom may be put forward: 'the black colour of an earthly atom is non-eternal, because it is a colour inhering in the substance of earth, just like the (newly produced) red colour etc.'. It is, therefore, to be admitted that the black colour is not really a beginningless entity. It is, however, said to be beginningless, because the black colour already produced is not—unlike the newly produced red colour—brought into existence by the effort of an ordinary living being.

Bhāṣya

The real answer [is as follows]—

Sūtra 67

No [i.e. the objection given in *sūtra* 64 above does not stand], because attachment etc. [i.e. the three afflictions, viz. attachment, aversion and ignorance] have for their cause deliberation also (*ca*). //iv.1.67//

Bhāṣya

The addition of [two further grounds refuting the objection]—viz. (i) because [attachment etc.] have for their cause action (*karman=adṛṣṭa*) and (ii) because [attachment etc.] are produced by one another themselves—[is implied by the word also (*ca*) in the *sūtra*].

[First], due to wrong deliberations which make one attached to, averse to and ignorant about [an object], there are produced [the three afflictions of] attachment, aversion and ignorance.

[Secondly], also the action [of a living being] which is an efficient cause for its birth is [to be admitted as] producing specific forms of attachment etc., because such specific forms are observed. Indeed, it is actually observed that some living beings are characterised by attachment in greater proportion, some by aversion in greater proportion and some by ignorance in greater proportion. [That is, the greater proportion of a particular evil in a particular individual must be due to its own action or *adṛṣṭa*].

[Thirdly], attachment etc. are produced also by one another themselves. Thus, one under ignorance becomes attached, one under ignorance gets angry [i.e. is characterised by aversion], one who gets attached becomes ignorant, and one who gets angry becomes ignorant.

None of the wrong deliberations is produced when right knowledge [is produced]. If the cause does not appear, the effect too cannot come into being, and hence, [in the state of liberation] the production of attachment etc. is absolutely impossible. [That is, in the state of liberation, the cause of the three afflictions or attachment etc.—viz. wrong deliberation—is destroyed for good by right knowledge. Thus, when one is liberated, the afflictions finally cease to exist because of the absence of the cause and cannot go on forever.]

Moreover, it is illogical [to claim] that the stream of afflictions [alone] is beginningless, for all these positive entities like the body etc. which are related to the self [in various ways] are being created [one after another] in a beginningless stream. [Thus, since even the beginningless entities like the body etc. are observed to be destroyed absolutely, it cannot be claimed that there is no absolute cessation of the stream of afflictions because it is beginningless.] Indeed, of these entities, there is not a single one, except right knowledge, which is not preceded by [a similar one] previously produced and no one of them [can be characterised as] the one produced 'first'. [That is, the body etc. also are produced in a beginningless stream. Each body, for instance, is preceded by a previous body, and each previous one by a further previous one, and so on. Thus, no single body, in the beginningless stream of bodies can be singled out as 'the first one'. Right knowledge, however, is not a beginningless entity, because, if it be so, false knowledge leading to re-birth etc. would not have been produced at all.] Even then [i.e. though it is admitted that a beginningless product may be absolutely destroyed], it cannot be admitted that an entity not characterised by origin also is characterised by destruction.

[In the state of liberation, one's] action (*adṛṣṭa*) which is an efficient cause for the birth of a living being does not act as a cause for the production of attachment etc. because of the removal of the wrong deliberations by right knowledge. However, the result in the form of the sensation of pleasure and pain is produced [even after one has acquired right knowledge, only so long as one's *prārabdha-karman* or the action which has already started to go into fruition is not destroyed through such experiences of pleasure and pain.] [Thus, when one has fully experienced all the results of one's past actions, he is no longer tortured by afflictions and attains final liberation.]

Elucidation

Though Gautama devotes a section to the critical examination of *apavarga*, he does not cite any proof establishing its reality. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, therefore, points out that the independent existence of *apavarga* is established by inference and ultimately, by the scripture or *śruti-pramāṇa*. As, for instance, Udayana puts forward the following inference in the *Kiraṇāvalī*: the continuous stream of sufferings is absolutely destroyed, because it is a continuous stream, as is the case with the continuous stream of the flames of a lamp. And there are numerous passages not only in the Upaniṣads but also in the Mantra portion of the Veda referring to the state of liberation.

Though it is unanimously accepted by all philosophers that, after liberation, there is no further suffering, there is divergence of opinion as to the exact nature of this absence—whether such an absence of suffering represents its (i) *prāgabhāva* (prior non-existence), (ii) *dhvaṃsābhāva* (non-existence in the form of destruction), or (iii) *atyantābhāva* (absolute non-existence).

The followers of the first alternative argue that when a person strives for liberation, he is guided by the desire 'let me have no further suffering' and it follows that he longs for the cessation of future sufferings, which, in fact, represents nothing but the *prāgabhāva* of suffering. Moreover, an examination of the implication of *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.2 also reveals that liberation as the removal of suffering due to the removal of false knowledge—as it has been spoken of therein—represents really the *prāgabhāva* of suffering. It may be objected that *prāgabbhāva* being a beginningless entity has no origin and it cannot be produced or accomplished by any amount of effort. Thus, it cannot represent an end attainable by some means. Liberation, however, is an end attainable by right knowledge. It is, therefore, illogical to equate liberation with the *prāgabhāva* of suffering. To this, it is to be answered that when right knowledge absolutely destroys the cause of suffering, there would be no further production of suffering and consequently, the *prāgabhāva* of suffering would not be destroyed, but remain forever. Thus, the *prāgabhāva* of suffering may be said to be attainable by right knowledge in the sense that it is, as if, protected by right knowledge, that the very possibility of its destruction is negated for good by right knowledge.

According to Gaṅgeśa, the above view was held by Prabhākara of the Mīmāṃsā school. Criticising it, Gaṅgeśa says that liberation cannot be equated to the *prāgabhāva* of suffering, because, in that case, there would follow the absurdity of suffering being produced even after liberation. There is a general rule to the effect that the counter-positive (*pratiyogin*) of a *prāgabhāva* must come into being at least once at some future period; otherwise, if the counter-positive be what comes into being never, its absence cannot be a *prāgabhāva* at all, for *prāgabhāva* means, by definition, the specific form of absence that exists prior to the production of an effect (which represents the counter-positive). Thus, if it is admitted that liberation is the *prāgabhāva* of suffering, one would also be forced to admit the production of suffering, at some future period, even after one has attained liberation. It would be of no avail to argue that, even if liberation means the *prāgabhāva* of suffering, there can be no further production of suffering due to the absence of its specific causes like *adharma* and the body etc. which are not possible in relation to the self of a liberated person, because, in that case, the absence of a liberated person's suffering would be not only beginningless (i.e. without origin), but also endless (i.e. without destruction) and become actually a case of *atyantābhāva*.

Though the above view attributed to Prabhākara by Gaṅgeśa is not upheld by any well-known Naiyāyika, Śaṃkara Miśra,, the author of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra*, has argued in favour of it. Answering the charge that such a view involves the absurdity of the production of suffering even after one has attained liberation, he says that *prāgabhāva* means an absence which has the capability (*yogyatā*) of producing the counter-positive; it does not matter whether it actually produces the counter-positive or not. That the *prāgabhāva* of suffering has the capability of producing suffering, is beyond doubt, for it is an established cause of suffering, as in the cases of ordinary persons. Still, it does not produce suffering in the state of liberation due to the circumstance that it is not the only cause for the production of suffering and the other causes like *adharma* etc. are all absent in that state.

According to some, liberation means the *atyantābhāva* of suffering, for, as they argue, liberation is a state when all sufferings have absolutely ceased, for all time to come, due to the final removal of the cause of suffering. Besides, the *śruti* '*duḥkhenātyantaṃ vimuktaś carati*' also corroborates the same position. One of the main objections against this view, however, is that *atyantābhāva* is an eternal entity and it cannot be accomplished or brought into existence by any amount of human effort. Thus, if liberation is equated to *atyantābhāva*, it cannot be represented as the highest goal of human existence—an end which one should strive to achieve by all means.

Gaṅgeśa and other followers of Nyāya maintain that liberation means the *dhvaṃsābhāva* of suffering, which is never contemporaneous with suffering. The self of an ordinary person also is a locus of the *dhvaṃsābhāva* of suffering, for various kinds of suffering appear and disappear at various moments in it. Still, his self cannot be said to be liberated, because the *dhvaṃsābhāva* of suffering therein is immediately followed by the production of some new suffering and thus, becomes contemporaneous with suffering itself. The *dhvaṃsābhāva* of suffering in the self of a liberated person, on the other hand, is never contemporaneous with suffering, because, after liberation, there is no further production of suffering.

Though it is generally accepted that, in the Nyāya view, liberation means an absolute cessation of suffering unaccompanied by any sensation of pleasure, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that there are reasons to suppose that a certain section of the Naiyāyikas believed that, according to Gautama, the state of liberation was also characterised by a constant sensation of pleasure. First, in the *Saṃkṣepaśaṃkarajaya* (xiv. 68-69), Mādhavācārya notes that, in the course of his wanderings, Śaṃkarācārya, once being asked by an arrogant Naiyāyika to differentiate Kaṇāda's concept of liberation from that of Gautama answered that, according to the former, liberation meant only a total annihilation of the specific qualities of the self and, according to the latter, the same state accompanied further by the sensation of pleasure. In the *Sarvadarśanasiddhāntasaṃgraha* also, Śaṃkarācārya spoke of the Nyāya view of liberation in a similar manner. Secondly, even Vātsyāyana has refuted, quite elaborately, a similar view of liberation under *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.22. Thirdly, Bhāsarvajña, a Naiyāyika of the Śaiva sect, strongly supports the view that liberation is also a state of eternal bliss. Fourthly, Veṅkatanātha of the Rāmānuja sect also argues, in his *Nyāyapariśuddhi* (Chowkhamba ed., part i, p.17) that Gautama too really admitted sensation of pleasure in liberation.

As against the above conclusion, it may be pointed out that Mādhavācārya, in his *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (under Akṣapādadarśana), refers to and explains only the generally accepted Nyāya view of liberation, and says that the manifestation of eternal bliss in liberation is advocated by Bhaṭṭa, Sarvajña and others. The well-known Navya-naiyāyika Gadādhara also, in his *Muktivāda*, refers to this view as the 'view of the Bhaṭṭa'. But, then, who is the philosopher referred to by the name Bhaṭṭa? It may reasonably be taken to stand for the famous Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila Bhaṭṭa who has indeed been often referred to in various philosophical works by this abbreviated name. Secondly, while examining the different theories on the nature of liberation, Udayana in his *Kiraṇāvalī* remarks that the view of sensatian of pleasure in liberation is upheld by the followers of Tautātita. There is good reason to believe that Tautātita was none other than the great Kumārila himself, for the *Viśvakośa*, though not assigning any ground; says that Tutāta and Tautātita are the synonyms of Kumārila and moreover, a verse quoted by Mādhavācārya, under the Pāṇinidarśana section of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, with the preliminary remark 'as it has been said by the followers of Tautātita'.is actually found in Kumārila's *Ślokavārtika* (Sphoṭavāda, verse 69). Thirdly, the remark of Kṛṣṇamiśra in the *Prabodhacandrodaya* (ii.3) which mentions the doctrine of Tutāta along with the view of Guru Prabhākara seems to indicate that Tutāta and Kumārila refer to the same person. Fourthly, Śaṃkarācārya in his *Sarvadarśanasiddhāntasaṃgraha* and the later Mīmāṃsaka Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa in his *Mānameyodaya* also ascribe such a view of liberation to Kumārila. Do not all these evidences point to the conclusion that it was Kumārila who advocated the doctrine of sensation of pleasure in liberation?

In answer to the above, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa contends that the admission of the experience of pleasure in liberation cannot be unquestionably ascribed to Kumārila, because Pārthasārathi Miśra, the celebrated commentator of Kumārila, rejects the doctrine of sensation of pleasure in liberation and critically establishes that liberation is only a total annihilation of all sufferings. He, however, notes that, even in earlier times, there had been controversy as to the real position of Kumārila on the nature of liberation. Besides, the verses which Mādhavācārya quotes under the Ārhatadarśana section of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* and ascribes to Tautātita, though agreeing in spirit with the words of Kumārila, are not found in the *Ślokavārtika*. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, therefore, suggests an alternative possibility that Tutāta was perhaps the name of some earlier Mīmāṃsaka whose views were very much in agreement with those of the later Kumārila.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF LIBERATION

(*apavarga-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

FIRST ĀHNIKA OF THE FOURTH CHAPTER ENDS

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LIST OF SŪTRA-S

Abbreviations used in the notes

ASS	NS, Nbh & NVr ed. Ānandāśrama Saṃskṛta Series
B	Ballentyne, *The Aphorisms of the Nyāya Philosophy of Gautama*, Allahabad 1850
Bibl. Ind.	NS & Nbh ed. Bibliotheca Indica
ChSS	*Nyāya-darśana* and the *Bhāṣya* with *Khadyota* by Gaṅgānātha Jhā and the *Bhāṣyacandra* by Raghūttama (on *NS* i.1.1-iii.2.17) ed. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series
Nbh	*Nyāya-bhāṣya*
NM	*Nyayamañjarī* by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, ed. Vizianagram Sanskrit Series
NS	*Nyāya-sūtra*
NSN	*Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha*
NV	*Nyāya-vārittika*, ed. Bibliotheca Indica
NVi	*Nyāya-sūtra-vivaraṇa*, ed. *Pandit*
NVr	*Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti*. See ASS.
nvr	*Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti*, ed. 1828
NVTT	*Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā*, ed. Vizianagram Sanskrit Series
R	*NS* with *NVr*, ed *Pandit* (by Rāmabhavana Śarmā). This dose not agree with the edition of the *Bibl. Ind.* or the ed. *nvr.*
V	Vidyābhūṣana's translation of *NS*.
VSS	*NS* with *Nbh*, ed. Gaṅgāḍhara Śāstrin, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series.

ADHYĀYA IV *ĀHNIKA I*

iv. 1. 1 / pravṛttir yathoktā.

iv. 1. 2 / tathā doṣāḥ.

iv. 1. 3 / trairāśyaṃ rāga-dveṣa-mohārthāntarabhāvāt.

iv. 1. 4 / na, eka-pratyanīka-bhāvāt.[1]

1. NV, NSN : *-pratyanīkatvāt*

iv. 1. 5 / vyabhicārād ahetuḥ.

iv. 1. 6 / teṣāṃ mohaḥ pāpīyān nāmūḍhasyetarotpatteḥ

iv. 1. 7 / [2]nimitta-naimittika-bhāvād arthāntarabhāvo doṣebhyaḥ.

2. NVr, Bibl. Ind., R, B, nvr and NVi add *prāptas tarhi* which, however occurs in the *avataraṇikā* of the *Bhāṣya* also.

iv. 1. 8 / na, doṣa-lakṣaṇāvarodhān[3] mohasya.

3. vr : *-virodhān.*

iv. 1. 9 / nimitta-namittikopapatteś ca tulya-jātīyānām apratiṣedhaḥ.

iv. 1. 10 / ātma-nityatve pretyabhāva-siddhiḥ.

iv. 1. 11 / vyaktād[4] vyaktānāṃ[5] pratyakṣa-prāmāṇyāt.

4. NV, NSN : *vyaktā.*
5. NM adds *utpattiḥ.*

iv. 1. 12 / na, ghaṭād ghaṭāniṣpatteḥ.

iv. 1. 13 / vyaktād ghaṭa-niṣpatter apratiṣedhaḥ.
iv. 1. 14 / abhāvād bhāvotpattir nānupamṛdya prādurbhāvāt.
iv. 1. 15 / [6]vyāghātād aprayogaḥ.

6. B, R, and nvr add *na.*

iv. 1. 16 / na, atītānāgatayoḥ kāraka-śabda-prayogāt[7].

7. NVTT : *-yogāt.*

iv. 1. 17 / na, vinaṣṭebhyo'niṣpattiḥ.
iv. 1. 18 / krama-nirdeśād apratiṣedhaḥ.
iv. 1. 19 / īśvaraḥ kāraṇam puruṣa-karmāphalya-darśanāt[8].

8. NVi, R : *karma-phalādarśanāt.*

iv. 1. 20 / na, puruṣa-karmābhāve phalāniṣpatteḥ.
iv. 1. 21 / tatkāritatvād ahetuḥ.
iv. 1. 22 / animittato bhāvotpattiḥ kaṇṭaka-taikṣṇyādi-darśanāt.
iv. 1. 23 / animittanimittatvān[9] nānimittataḥ.

9. B, nvr, NVi, R : *-nimittato*

iv. 1. 24 / nimittānimittayor arthāntara-bhāvād apratiṣedhaḥ.
iv. 1. 25 / sarvam anityam utpatti-vināśa-dharmakatvāt.[10]

10. R : *-vināśaka-dharmikatvāt.*

iv. 1. 26 / na, anityatā-nityatvāt.
iv. 1. 27 / tad anityam agner dāhyam[11] vināśyānuvināśavat.

11. B and nvr : *dāhya-vināśānuvināśavat.*

iv. 1. 28 / nityasyāpratyākhyānam yathopalabdhi-vyavasthānāt.
iv. 1. 29 / sarvam nityam pañca-bhūta-nityatvāt.
iv. 1. 30 / na, utpatti-vināśa-kāraṇopalabdheḥ[12].

12. Ruben does not include *sūtra*-s 30-32 in his list.

iv. 1. 31 / tal-lakṣaṇāvarodhād apratiṣedhaḥ.
iv. 1. 32 / na, utpatti-tatkāraṇopalabdheḥ.
iv. 1. 33 / na, vyavasthānupapatteḥ.
iv. 1. 35 / na, aneka-lakṣaṇair eka-bhāva-niṣpatteḥ.
iv. 1. 36 / lakṣaṇa-vyavasthānād evāpratiṣedhaḥ.
iv. 1. 37 / sarvam abhāvo bhāveṣvitaretarābhāvasiddheḥ.
iv. 1. 38 / na, svabhāva-siddher bhāvānām.
iv. 1. 39 / na svabhāva-siddhir[13] āpekṣikatvāt.

13. NVi : *siddher.*

iv. 1. 40 / vyāhatatvād[14] ayuktam.

14. B and nvr : *āhatatvād.*

iv. 1. 41 / saṃkhyaikāntāsiddhiḥ kāraṇānupapattyupapattibhyām.
iv. 1. 42 / na, kāraṇāvayava-bhāvāt.

iv. 1. 43 / niravayavatvād ahetuḥ.

iv. 1. 44 / sadyaḥ kālāntare ca phala-niṣpatteḥ saṃśayaḥ[15]

15. See page 58, fn.

iv. 1. 45 / kālāntareṇāniṣpattir[16] hetu-vināśāt.[17]

16. NV : *aniṣpatter* ; Nvi : *na kālāntare niṣpattiḥ.*

17. NVi : *-nāśāt.*

iv. 1. 46 / prāṅ niṣpatter vṛkṣa-phalavat tat syāt.

iv. 1. 47 / nāsan na san[18] na sad- asad sadasator[19] vaidharmyāt.

18. NVi : *na san nāsan.*

19. Bibl. Ind. : *asat-sator.*

iv. 1. 48 / utpāda-vyaya-darśanāt.[20]

20. See *Elucidation.*

iv. 1. 49 / buddhi-siddhaṃ tu tad asat.[21]

21. cf. However, Jayanta's remark (NM 496): *prarihṛtaṃ bhāṣyakāreṇa*... ....

iv. 1. 50 / āśraya-vyatirekād vṛkṣa-phalotpattivad[22] ityahetuḥ.

22. B, nvr and R omit *utpatti.*

iv. 1. 51 / prīter ātmāśrayatvād apratiṣedhaḥ.[23]

23. B, nvr and R : *ahetuḥ.*

iv. 1. 52 / na, putra-strī-paśu-paricchada[24]-hiraṇyānnādi-phala-nirdeśāt.

24. NVTT : *pariccheda.*

iv. 1. 53 / tat-sambandhāt phalaniṣpattes teṣu phalavad upacāraḥ.

iv. 1. 54 / vividha-bādhanā-yogād duḥkham eva janmotpattiḥ.

iv. 1. 55 / na[25], sukhasyāpyantarāla-niṣpatteḥ.[26]

25. nvr and B omit *na.*

26. B and NV : *nivṛtteḥ.*

iv. 1. 56 / bādhanānivṛtter[27] vedayataḥ paryeṣaṇa[28]-doṣād apratiṣedhaḥ.

27. NV and NSN (not in ChSS and NVTT) : *-nivṛtter.*

28. ASS : *paryeṣaṇā.*

iv. 1. 57 / duḥkha-vikalpe sukhābhimānāc ca.

iv. 1. 58 / ṛṇa-kleśa-pravṛttyanubandhād apavargābhāvaḥ.

iv. 1. 59 / pradhāna-śabdānupapatter[29] guṇa-śabdenānuvādo[30] nindā-praśaṃsopapatteḥ.

29. NV : *pradhāna-śabdena.*

30. Some edition of NV reads *guṇa-śabdenāyam arthavādo* instead.

iv. 1. 60 / samāropaṇād[31] ātmanyapratiṣedhaḥ.

[31] R, B, nvr and NVi : *samāropād.*

iv. 1. 61 / pātracayāntānupapatteś ca phalābhāvaḥ.
iv. 1. 62 / suṣuptasya svapnādarśane kleśābhāvād apavargaḥ.
iv. 1. 63 / na pravṛttiḥ pratisandhānāya[32] hīnakleśasya.

[32] B and nvr : *pratisandhānāpa.*

iv. 1. 64 / na, kleśa-santateḥ svābhāvikatvāt.
iv. 1. 65 / prāg-utpatter abhāvānityatvavat svābhāvike'pyanityatvam.[33]

[33] In NVr *sūtra*-s 65 and 66 are read as a single *sūtra.*

iv. 1. 66 / aṇu-śyāmatā'nityatvād vā.
iv. 1. 67 / na, saṃkalpa- nimittatvāc ca rāgādīnām.

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